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Abstract
International election monitoring is a phenomenon that began to spread rapidly in the
1990s and has since become an essential element of elections in the developing world. This study
assesses the relationship between the presence of international election monitors during
presidential elections and levels of voters’ confidence in the electoral process. Several questions
guide the study: How did the norm of international election monitoring develop and how widely
do governments adhere to this norm? Are citizens more confident in the efficacy and
transparency of presidential elections when international monitors are present? I hypothesize
that when governments adhere to the norm of international election monitoring by inviting
international observers, citizens will have higher levels of confidence in the electoral process. I
conduct a comparative case study examining the presidential elections in Benin, Mali, and
Guinea between 1990 and 2011. Using election monitors’ reports, literature surrounding each of
the elections, and public opinion survey data reflecting citizens’ perceptions of the elections and
democracy in their countries, I test the relationship between the two variables in my model. The
findings suggest that a positive correlation between the variables is likely. However, because no
data currently exists that directly measures the impacts of international election monitors, the
study ultimately concludes that further research must be done to confirm the positive relationship
between international monitors’ presence and voters’ confidence levels.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
When the electorate believes that elections have been free and fair, they can be a
powerful catalyst for better governance, greater security and human development.
But in the absence of credible elections, citizens have no recourse to peaceful
political change. The risk of conflict increases while corruption, intimidation, and
fraud go unchecked, rotting the entire political system slowly from within.
(Annan 2012)
Free and fair elections are one of the main determinants of the level of democracy in a
country. While not the only significant criterion for a successful democracy, the international
community generally accepts that free, fair, and competitive elections provide the political
environment appropriate for the institutionalization of democracy in a state. However, the mere
existence of an electoral process does not convey its impact on those whom it affects most, a
state’s populace. As Kofi Annan (2012) states, voters’ perceptions of political and electoral
efficacy are integral to the democratization process and the stability of established democracies.
The study of democratization is not new to the field of international relations, however
there are aspects of it, such as the promotion of democracy through election monitoring, that
have just recently begun to emerge as important areas for close study (Bjornlund 2004). Since
the 1980s, election monitoring has become increasingly more widespread. Today, it is accepted
that while established democracies do not need to invite election monitors in order to hold
elections the international community views as legitimate, countries in the process of
democratizing are expected to do so. “Given that countries have traditionally guarded elections
as a strictly domestic affair and a sacred hallmark of sovereignty, the rapid expansion of
monitoring is stunning” (Kelley 2012b, 3). The acceptance of election monitoring shows the
changing norms of the international system from sovereignty and noninterference to
participatory rights, freedom of expression, and self-determination.
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The international norm of election observation took hold throughout the 1990s and today
is internalized by a vast majority of countries around the world. While the literature on the rise of
the norm of election monitoring and how monitors operate is extensive, it currently lacks
attentive examination of how the effects of the emergence and internalization of election
observation influence the levels of voters’ confidence in the efficacy and transparency of
elections in emerging democracies. As Birch (2008) writes, “Surprisingly little is known about
the factors associated with popular confidence in electoral processes,” yet “the legitimacy of the
electoral process is crucial for the establishment and maintenance of a healthy democracy” (305).
Additionally, the understanding of citizens’ confidence in their elections is crucial to maintaining
a functioning democracy since lack of confidence can cause problems stemming from a decrease
in voter participation and less confidence in the integrity of the process.
Africa is a continent where many individual countries continue to struggle to build a
democratic system. The democratic ideal is popular and democracy remains the principal form of
government in the world, yet within democracies there is still discontent (Dorenspleet 2012,
280). While each country faces its own internal issues, many countries also deal with common
factors that hold them back from achieving a democracy. For example, French colonization
permeated West Africa and permeated the culture and politics of countries in the region. By
1960, former French colonies became independent and began to govern themselves and make
their own policies. Some of these countries had reached the status of “democracy” before
encountering problems and falling back into the categories of “military regime,” “restricted
democratic practice,” or “emerging democracy” (African Elections Database 2012). While many
West African countries still have corrupt electoral practices, there are also beacons of hope for
true democracy in the region that can be seen in the successful practices being implemented by
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countries such as Benin and Senegal. Because of the examples of both success and struggles
toward democracy, francophone West Africa is a region especially important to the study of
elections and election monitoring today.
This study analyzes election monitoring through the lens of how the emergence and
formal adherence to the norm has affected levels of voter confidence in electoral efficacy and
transparency in francophone West Africa. The questions guiding this study include how did the
norm of international election monitoring develop and how widely do governments formally
adhere to it? Are voter turnout rates higher in monitored elections? Do public opinion data reflect
higher levels of confidence in electoral efficacy and transparency when monitors are involved? I
hypothesize that formal adherence to the norm of international election monitoring has led to
higher levels of voters’ confidence in presidential elections in emerging democracies. My
hypothesis is based on the assumptions that international norms matter and that election monitors
affect both how electoral processes function and how key actors perceive them.
In order to measure these perceptions and levels of confidence, I examine the relationship
between two variables. The independent variable I use in my study is formal adherence to the
norm of international election monitoring. The dependent variable is the level of voter
confidence in the efficacy and transparency of presidential elections in a country. The
operationalization and conceptualization of these variables, as well as the research design I
employ in my study will be discussed in Chapter Two: Methodology.
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Organizational Preview
Chapter Two: Literature and Theory Review examines the existing literature and
theoretical foundations surrounding the development and life cycle of norms, the norm of
international election monitoring, the role of elections in democracy, election monitors and voter
confidence. I discuss the relevant theoretical lenses of constructivism and institutionalism. I
then explain how states signal their desire for legitimacy by adhering to norms, and how the
timing of the norm’s emergence helped it to take hold in the international system. I discuss the
importance of elections with integrity, as well as how international election monitors assess the
freeness and fairness of elections. I then define voter confidence and attempt to fill the gap in
the existing literature between election monitors’ work and how their presence affects voters’
confidence levels in the electoral system.
The third chapter, Research Design and Methodology, describes how I will conduct this
study. The independent variable in my model is formal adherence to the norm of international
election monitoring. I operationalize the variable by examining governments’ invitation of
international monitors to elections. The dependent variable is voters’ confidence levels in the
electoral process. I operationalize this variable by analyzing specific indicators of citizen desire
for and satisfaction with democracy and their trust in the elections and the institutions
surrounding them. I hypothesize that formal government adherence to the norm of international
election monitoring leads to higher levels of voter confidence in the efficacy and transparency of
the elections. I then outline the reasoning behind my case study approach and the process of
selecting my three cases.
Chapter Four describes the case of Benin. I introduce the variables in the context of
Benin, and analyze in detail the five multiparty presidential elections Benin has held since 1990,
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using relevant literature and election monitors’ reports, as well as public opinion surveys to
understand citizens’ perceptions of the elections. I also draw basic conclusions about the
implications of this case.
The fifth chapter is organized similarly to the previous chapter and examines the case of
Mali. I discuss the historical context of four presidential elections in Mali and election monitors’
roles in these elections. I assess Malians’ perspectives on electoral freeness and fairness, their
satisfaction with democracy, and their trust in political institutions in addition to other variables
by analyzing public opinion surveys. I draw conclusions about citizens’ levels of confidence in
the electoral process in Mali. I end the chapter by describing the support I find for my
hypothesis.
Chapter Six presents the case of Guinea. Unlike the other two cases, no survey data is
available about Guinea’s elections. While I still conduct an in-depth analysis of the conditions
surrounding the four elections in Guinea between 1990 and 2011, I analyze the dependent
variable by using information in secondary sources. I find that my results are less conclusive in
this chapter than in the other cases, but I am still able to draw some conclusions.
The last chapter presents an analysis of my data and the overall conclusions of the study.
I discuss the possible relationship between the independent and dependent variables in my
model. Next, I describe both the implications and limitations of the study. I conclude by making
suggestions for further research. This study helps to build an understanding about the
relationship between the rise of the norm of international election monitoring, government
adherence to the norm, and the effects of that adherence on citizens. This research advances the
existing literature by filling gaps and encouraging further research on the topic to strengthen the
findings in this study.
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter examines the literature surrounding the topics of the rise of international
norms, the case of international election monitoring, and voters’ confidence. The timing of the
emergence of the international norm of election monitoring in the 1990s means that a growing
body of literature on the topic has begun to emerge very recently. Within this existing literature,
scholars focus on many different aspects of election monitors and their impacts on elections,
including levels of pre-election manipulations and post-election violence (see Daxacker 2012;
Hyde and Mahoney 2011). There is not much of a direct focus on the impacts of election
monitors on citizens’ perceptions of electoral efficacy and transparency, so I bring together
literature that separately address these topics. In order to carry out an effective study of timely
significance and to construct a well-founded hypothesis, I evaluate the relevant theoretical
literature concerning the emergence and formal adherence to the international norm of election
monitoring and levels of voter confidence in electoral efficacy.

Theoretical Foundations
Neorealism and Neoliberalism
Neorealism and neoliberalism have long been accepted as the primary theories used to
analyze actors’ behavior in the international system. These theories focus primarily on power
dynamics and incentive structures to explain a variety of states’ decisions and actions including
those resulting in wars, treaties, and diplomatic discussions. However, these theories are not as
successful in their interpretations of the influence of norms on state behavior (Florini 1996, 363).
Neorealism and neoliberalism largely avoid explanations of how international norms create
incentives for states to change their behavior, and in some cases, even their identity as an actor.
Instead, they characterize norms as “unexplained sources of the exogenously given preferences
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of actors” (Florini 1996, 363). Neorealists, focusing mainly on state security, are mostly
interested in the way norms change the distribution of power in the system (Florini 1996, 365).
Neoliberals emphasize cooperation, and are therefore more susceptive to normative ideals, but
still do not heavily incorporate norms into their theory (Florini 1996, 365). Therefore, I reject
these theories as being relatively ineffective in explaining the emergence, spread, and adherence
to the norm of international election monitoring and focus on theories that are more conducive to
the abstract nature of norms in order to analyze the relationship between adherence to the norm
and changes in citizens’ levels of confidence in their electoral system.

Constructivism
Ample literature exists explaining the processes through which international norms are
created and spread throughout the global arena. I base my study on the assumption that
international norms influence international relations by shaping actors’ preferences and guiding
the choices they make, an assumption made by authors from both the English School and
constructivism (Sandholtz 2009, 2; Santa-Cruz 2005, 22). Today, most scholars generally accept
this assumption, excluding some neorealists (Checkel 1997, 473). Martha Finnemore and
Kathryn Sikkink (1998), experts recognized for their study of international norms, define a norm
as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (891). Scholarly attention
to the spread of norms is largely within the constructivist theoretical framework, as
constructivism acknowledges the protean nature of the world, and therefore claims the structure
of the international system is constantly being reshaped and remolded. This interpretive theory
stresses the inter-subjectivity of the international system and argues that actors operate in an
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interactive normative environment that affects their identity, their interests, and their views of
other actors (Viotti and Kaupi 2012, 280).
The idea that international politics is heavily influenced by rules, beliefs, and practices
shared by states with divergent goals and interests contributes to the significance of the
assumption that norms determine the rules of the international arena by designating certain
behaviors as appropriate and legitimate (Viotti and Kaupi 2012, 282). In fact, there are “logics
of appropriateness” that claim actors will act rationally in ways that other actors perceive as
appropriate in order to maintain legitimacy (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 888). In the world
today, there is a “constellation of existing norms, which provides the normative structure within
which actors decide what to do, determine how to justify their acts, and evaluate the behavior of
others” (Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, 6). Yet how do perceptions of which actions are viewed as
appropriate change throughout the international system?
In addition to creating an underlying sense of order from an inter-subjective
understanding of acceptable practices, norms lead states to change their patterns of behavior over
time by either defining state identities or prescribing behavior, and in some cases, both (Viotti
and Kaupi 2012, 285-286). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim that changes in norms and
ideas are the most influential factors in reshaping the system (894). However, the understanding
of how norms create political change is a much more complex concept than the idea that norms
determine behavior of actors in the international system. The mere existence of a norm does not
inevitably alter a state’s behavior (Kelley 2008, 224). In fact, even when actors do adhere to
existing norms, there is often choice involved between a variety of norms, some of which
contradict each other (Santa-Cruz 2005, 15).
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Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that like many other theories in international
relations, constructivism better explains the system in periods of stability rather than periods of
change (888). One reason for this could be the oversimplification of the role and importance of
norms. The relationship between international actors and norms cannot be viewed as a unilateral
interaction. Instead, just as norms influence actors’ identity and conduct, actors’ behaviors
reshape the norms that exist (Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, 7). The case of international election
monitoring provides a fitting example through which to study the complexity of the theoretical
framework surrounding a significant change in accepted international norms and perceptions of
appropriate behavior in presidential elections.

Institutionalism
Martha Finnemore (1996) argues that sociology’s theory of institutionalism is relevant to
scholars interested in international relations and political science. While similar in substance to
the English school in that it focuses on the relationships between organizations and culture,
institutionalism is different than the typical international relations theories (Finnemore 1996,
328). Institutionalism “provides a much richer and more detailed theoretical framework than has
constructivism” (Finnemore 1996, 327). Instead of just stressing the value of social structures,
institutionalists delve deeper to analyze the interactions between different norms in all different
areas. Addressing the concern that constructivism lacks the ability to explain the international
system in times of change, Finnemore (1996) highlights that institutionalism encompasses
change by acknowledging that states’ identities and interests change depending on what norms
are influential and widely accepted in the system, whether national or global, at the time
(Finnemore 1996, 327-330).
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Much of the institutionalist view of the spread of norms has to do with the diffusion of
ideas spreading from the West (Finnemore 1996, 331). Western states strive to dominate the
system politically, economically, and ideologically. The Western cultural value of individualism
has permeated the areas of human and legal rights (Finnemore 1996, 332-333). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, international election monitoring first appeared in the Americas and “became an
export commodity of the new ‘system of interests’” (Santa-Cruz 2005, 59). Election monitoring
is an example of the value placed on individuals’ freedom of expression and participatory rights
being upheld, in addition to its strong Western ties as a pro-democracy norm.
Realism and liberalism make assumptions about actors’ interests and how these interests
motivate the actors’ behaviors. These theoretical perspectives therefore maintain that states with
divergent interests will act differently. Institutionalism comes to a different conclusion, claiming
that norms allow actors with contrasting interests to have very similar behavior (Finnemore
1996, 334). While institutionalism questions exactly why this holds true, they move beyond
realist and liberalist thinking about state behavior since institutionalists do not assume states will
act a certain way, providing the possibility for more research about state’s motivations
(Finnemore 1996, 337). This view of state behavior applies to the case of international election
monitoring. Some corrupt governments cheat in elections to maintain power yet still invite
monitors, for example. Other states invite monitors to some elections but not to others. While
realism and liberalism can answer certain aspects of the desire for power and states’ self-interest
as motivation, these theories do not explain why states would risk damaging their own
legitimacy by not inviting monitors or by risking cheating in elections. Institutionalism offers an
alternative theoretical framework through which to study these topics and others. A major flaw
with this perspective that could limit its applicability is the lack of case study analysis used to
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relate the theory to world culture (Finnemore 1996, 340). Therefore, institutionalism can be
useful to research about election monitoring when used in combination with international
relations theoretical perspectives.

The Development of the Norm of International Election Monitoring
Crucial to the constructivist argument is the understanding of the emergence and
development of norms. A common argument is that the development of new norms comes from a
need for change in existing norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This need can stem from a
lack of cooperation between actors in the “mixed-motive setting” (Florini 1996, 365) that is
present in the international arena when there are contrasting values and ideas. Ironically, while
norms exist because of inter-subjective consensus over expectations regarding particular
behaviors, norms also “evolve in part through challenges to that consensus” (Viotti and Kaupi
2012, 313).
The development of the norm of international election monitoring can be used as a lens
through which to examine more generally the emergence, evolution, and spread of norms.
Kelley (2008) contends that norms, “as with many other social processes, are complex
combinations of normative, instrumental, and other constraints and causes of action” (221). The
norm of international election monitoring is particularly complex, and consequently intriguing,
since the ultimate goal is not that all governments will invite election monitors, but instead that
emerging democracies will invite monitors until the point when they develop a mature, stable
democratic system and can “graduate out of the practice” (Kelley 2008, 223). International
election monitoring is also a norm of particular intrigue because while it is expected that states
adhere to norms that match its interests, it is more difficult to understand why a state would
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respect a norm that challenges its interests (Hyde 2011, 3). In the cases of some governments,
mainly those who use some form of corrupt practices in electoral processes, the invitation of
international election monitors is not in their best interest. What motivates these states to adhere
to the norm when “compliance is costly” (Hyde 2011, 4)? The international community regards
the convention of governments of emerging democracies inviting election monitors to their
elections as an expected step in the democratization process today, but it is important to
understand exactly what gave rise to this supposition.

Signaling Theory
The literature presents differing theories on how norms undergo modifications. One way
to understand the creation of new norms is through “signaling theory.” This theory of normative
change argues that states may seemingly act against their interests to comply with certain norms,
but in doing so, the state is actually attempting to send a specific signal to either an international
or domestic audience in order to obtain a reaction (Hyde 2011, 4). Hyde (2011) contends that
states gauge possible advantages they can attain through the adherence to a norm and act upon
this cost-benefit analysis. Because the information exchanged between states is not always
accurate, actors do not always know how to evaluate the motivations and interests of other states.
In order to showcase their “desirable characteristics” (Hyde 2011, 188), states will attempt to
signal other actors. States will act intentionally to send credible signals “when they perceive that
doing so will increase their share of internationally allocated benefits, such as foreign aid,
increased foreign investment, tourism, trade, membership in international organizations, and
legitimacy and prestige” (Hyde 2011, 3). If other states perceive this signal as legitimate, the
signaled behavior will spread (Hyde 2011, 188). Therefore, one possible argument is that
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election monitoring developed as an “unintended norm” (Hyde 2011, 188) because it resulted
from individual states’ incentives for compliance, not massive efforts from norm entrepreneurs,
international organizations, institutions, or other states to promote the norm.
In the case of election monitoring, states wanted to signal their support of democracy
after the Cold War. The invitation of international, nonpartisan monitors proved to be the most
effective signal of this commitment since it was a trend that states noticed (Hyde 2011, 189).
Hyde (2011) argues that this particular signal is so effective because it holds costs for the
“pseudo-democrats” who invite monitors in an attempt to “mimic the signal” (189). These
pseudo-democrats have to weigh the costs and benefits of their corrupt elections and decide
whether to risk the costs of a negative assessment or accept “a virtually nonexistent chance that
their elections will be viewed as democratic” (Hyde 2011, 192). This dilemma causes some
states to change their behavior so that they can invite monitors without negative repercussions,
and causes other states to abstain from inviting monitors because they want to continue cheating.
Because of the high costs associated with cheating, it seems logical that citizens living in states
that invite monitors have higher confidence levels in the efficacy and transparency of the
electoral process in these states since cheating should not occur without consequence in the
presence of international monitors.

The “Life Cycle” of Norms
A different perspective on the development of norms examines the three stages of the
norm “life cycle”: emergence, norm cascade, and internalization. Critical to the first stage,
emergence, is the role of norm entrepreneurs. These are the actors who are responsible for
constructing “cognitive frames” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897) that create specific
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perceptions about an issue. They do so by using language to refer to the issue that alters the way
other actors view that issue. At this point, the “logic of appropriateness” comes into play, as
norm entrepreneurs must usually act outside of the “logic of appropriateness” to promote the
norm currently under construction (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897). In the case of
international election monitoring, norm entrepreneurs including international NGOs, the United
Nations, and the Carter Center played a significant role in incorporating election monitoring into
a set of preexisting norms. Norms promoting human rights, democratic rights, and elections set a
“normative enabling environment” monitoring (Kelley 2008, 226) for the emergence of the norm
of election. However, while some existing norms set the foundation for the emergence of
election monitoring, others presented an obstacle to doing so. The norms of state sovereignty
and noninterference were also strongly supported pre-established norms, so there was a period of
disagreement and “contestation” (Kelley 2008, 227) over the clash of these two types of norms.
Election monitoring is one of the forces that have gradually changed the system’s understanding
of sovereignty, as now sovereignty includes a component of international legitimacy (Santa-Cruz
2005, 7-8).
The next step in the emergence of a norm is for the norm entrepreneurs to find or
construct an “organizational platform” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 899) they can use to
promote the spread of the norm, which often consists of an international organization, a
transnational advocacy network, or a nongovernmental organization. These actors are helpful in
providing legitimacy to the new behavior or outlook on the issue at hand. In 1989, the
Organization of American States (OAS) was one of several organizations that decided to send
election observers to member states upon request (Kelley 2008, 227-228). This encouraged
other organizations to consider institutionalizing the norm and to create capacity for election
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monitoring into their systems. With the influence of organizational platforms such as the OAS,
or other similarly influential organizations, more actors are likely to back the new idea and
further its progress towards becoming a norm.
There are many important developments remaining in the life cycle of a norm after the
emergence stage. Before reaching the second stage in the norm life cycle, the norm cascade, the
emergent norm is often institutionalized into organizations or areas of international rules. As the
emergent norm begins to take hold more widely, other actors view it as legitimate and
incorporate adherence that norm into their identity and behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998,
900). Between the first two stages in the norm life cycle is a “tipping point” where the norm
reaches a threshold of a certain number of actors adopting the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998, 895). There is no way to tell when the tipping point will occur, nor how many actors are
involved in the process of tipping a norm towards the norm cascade. Actors perceive the support
of states with a relationship to the issue involved as more influential than states are less involved
in the issue. Because of this, some states will be viewed as “critical” (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998, 901) to a norm’s acceptance, whereas other states play a less significant role. Even though
the timing of the tipping point’s occurrence is difficult to anticipate, the existing trend is that the
norm must be adopted by at least one-third of the total number of states in the system
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 901). This was exactly the case in the norm of international
election monitoring, as the number of emerging democracies that invited election monitors
increased from 28% in 1989 to 44% in 1990 (Kelley 2008, 227). The timing of this tipping point
can be challenging to explain, but Kelley (2008) proposes that the end of the Cold War impacted
the international system in a way that altered the norms that actors viewed as most important
(228). States recognized the failure of the Soviet Union and subsequently turned towards
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Western norms. Once the emergent norm reaches its tipping point, states and other actors begin
adopting it without the same level of domestic pressures as were necessary before the tipping
point. This stage is referred to as the “norm cascade” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902).
The norm cascade is based upon the process of international socialization. The cascade is
characterized by the “wider and faster spread of the norm after the tipping point” (Kelley 2008,
229). After the tipping point of the norm of international election monitoring in 1990, at which
point 44% of all non-established democracies invited election monitors, the norm continued to
spread so that by 1998, almost 70% of all non-established democracies were inviting monitors
(Kelley 2008, 229). Through process of the norm cascade, norm entrepreneurs and supporters
convince other actors to accept the norm. They do this through the encouragement and support
of actors who adhere to the norm and the admonishment of those who do not. States react to the
external pressure put on them by evaluating the costs of rejecting the norm against the benefits
that could be gained by adhering to it. Most states desire to maintain legitimacy both from the
international community and their domestic citizenry, so they act in ways that will satisfy these
populations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 903-904). Kelley (2008) argues that some
governments began inviting election monitors in reaction to the West’s support of free and fair
elections, but that other governments only invited monitors to appear legitimate (230).
The last stage in the norm life cycle is internalization. Once a norm has become
internalized, it becomes embedded in the identity of actors. At this point, states no longer
question compliance. The norms may even become so integrated into practice that they become
difficult to distinguish from preexisting ideologies and beliefs. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998,
904-905). In my study, I hesitate to say that the norm of international election monitoring has
been fully internalized since there are a number of states that either reject the norm or have a
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complicated relationship with it. I instead discuss “formal adherence” to the norm, which does
not suggest the same level of acceptance and habit as does the term “internalization.” This
accounts for the states that continue to manipulate the system by inviting lenient monitors to
their elections in order to continue cheating, and a handful of governments such as those in
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Cuba, Syria, and Uzbekistan, that continue to reject monitors’ presence
in their elections altogether, as well as the states that invite monitors to some, but not all, of their
elections (Kelley 2008, 232).

Restructuring the Normative Environment
Sandholtz and Stiles (2009) argue that existing literature misses important elements of
normative change. They claim that “normative systems are inherently dynamic, and it is that
built-in dynamism that is missing from any analytical approach that sees rules simply as
outcomes of bargaining or political processes” (Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, 6). To fill this gap in
the literature, the authors describe a model of normative change comprising of action, dispute,
argument, and finally change (Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, 3). The dispute causes a reevaluation
of what the norm encourages and permits, meaning that it will be restructured to become more or
less strict and broader or narrower in scope (Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, 6).
In the case of international election monitoring, this “dispute” could be viewed as the
tension between norms prioritizing the rights and freedoms of states and those favoring
individual freedoms. International human rights based norms and pro-democracy norms began
challenging the traditional concepts of sovereignty and nonintervention beginning after World
War II and started gathering force in the 1990s (Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, 289-290). The
concepts of freedom of expression and participatory rights, as well as an emerging right to
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democracy, provided alternatives to the norms that had been generally accepted (Kelley 2008,
242; Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, 23). For the first time, “the post-World War II era allowed for
the justification of international involvement in domestic state affairs because states believed
democracy was crucial for upholding international peace and security” (Sandholtz and Stiles
2009, 294). An example of this push for democracy is found in the Preamble of the 1950 Charter
for the Organization of American States, that declares, “representative democracy is an
indispensible condition of stability, peace and development” (Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, 294).
The belief that democracy provides an achievable avenue through which to increase the stability
of the international system continues today. Kofi Annan (2012) contends, “the time is right to
underscore the rule of law, democratic governance and citizen empowerment as integral
elements to achieving sustainable development, security and a durable peace” (4). The
possibility of achieving these goals is a driving motivational force for actors to embrace prodemocracy norms.
The changing normative environment surrounding the right to democracy after World
War II was not the only significant cause of respect for pro-democracy norms. The end of the
Cold War caused a shift in the power structure of the international system being bipolar to unipolar, with the United States as the dominant world power. Therefore, states began to search for
legitimacy in the new system structure by internalizing the West’s push for democracy (Kelley
2008, 229-230). Due to the normative environment of the 1990s, “election monitoring emerged
out of an intensive debate that specifically pitted democracy and human norms against traditional
sovereignty norms” (Kelley 2008, 242). While it is clear that pro-democracy norms became
more highly valued after the Cold War, there are still elements of the relationship between

19
democracy, elections, and election monitoring, and monitors’ effects on voters’ confidence levels
that are missing from the existing literature.

The Role of Elections in Democracy
“Elections can further democracy, development, human rights, and security, or
undermine them, and for this reason alone they should command attention and priority” (Annan
2012, 5). One of the most important and most easily identifiable aspects of a democracy is the
electoral process. The international community acknowledges elections as the foundation of
successful governance (Bjornlund 2004, 33). Voting gives the population of a country the
chance to stress their own beliefs and expectations of their leader by voting for the most capable
candidate and choosing whether or not to re-elect an officer already in power. This can serve as
a form of accountability by preventing leaders who might consider abusing their power by
engaging in corrupt activities to refrain from doing so because of the chance that they could be
exposed (Philp 2001, 359). While “there is much more to having democracy and making it work
than free, fair, and truly competitive elections,” it is important to realize that effective elections
are crucial to maintaining a functioning democracy (Diamond 2009, xviii).
Over the course of the past two decades, there has been a massive shift towards
democracy. In 1989, there were 48 democracies, whereas today the world recognizes 95
democratic countries (Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security 2012, 12).
Doig and Theobold (2000) state that while there is “no single checklist of a democracy,” the
most important components include “political legitimacy for the state through universal suffrage
and regular elections; the peaceful transfer of power; an effective political opposition and
representative government; accountability through transparency of decision making [and];
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effective standards of conduct in public office” (15). Of these elements, the pro-democracy
norms of the individual right to vote, a representative government, and regular elections stand
out. The “political legitimacy” mentioned has come to reside with democratic and undemocratic
systems alike, as countries that do not have democratic systems have begun holding elections in
recent years. Surprisingly, only 11 countries did not hold elections over the past 12 years
(Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security 2012, 12). Merely holding
elections does not signal that a country is democratic or abides by democratic principles,
however. Some states use “façade elections” (Lindberg 2009, 6) to attempt to project themselves
under a certain light to the international community. The difference between “the veneer of
democratic legitimacy and genuine democratic legitimacy is electoral integrity” (Global
Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security 2012, 12).
As the world and the relationship between the actors within it continues to change,
elections are a chance for countries to signal their commitment to upholding democratic
principles and to respecting the will of their citizens. Since elections play such an integral role in
the development and perpetuation of democracy, I focus the majority of my independent study
on elements that surround successful elections today; voter confidence levels and election
monitors. These components of elections did not become associated with the study of
democracy of electoral processes until the 1990s, but are relevant issues to the way the
international system functions today. As Birch (2010) articulates, “the study of electoral
confidence is key to understanding the role of elections in the ever-widening world of
competitive politics” (1616). I agree with Birch, and push her argument even further to examine
the link between that confidence and the role of election monitors in presidential elections.
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Elections With Integrity
The connotation “free and fair” has become an expected component of the evaluation of
democratic elections. The phrase originated from the United Nations’ designation of the
elections of newly independent states as being “free and fair” in an effort to legitimize their
status as independent states. The phrase appeared in Togoland’s 1956 independence referendum
and has been incorporated into the evaluation of democratic elections as the “rhetorical
touchstone for most assessments” (Elklit and Svensson 2001, 201; Bjornlund 2004, 96) ever
since. In order to evaluate the standards that qualify elections as being “free and fair,” there
must be a concrete way to quantify and assess these two measurements of democracy. This can
be a challenging task because of the possible difficulties of both identifying the presence of
certain elements in a state’s electoral process and combining these multiple factors into one score
that designates the election as “free and fair” or not (Elklit and Svensson 2001, 202).
The concepts of “free” and “fair” are often perceived as being synonymous because how
often they are used in tandem. However, there are important distinctions that differentiate
freedom from fairness. The term “free” is used to describe voters’ opportunity to choose
between multiple options and not face any limitations or restrictions to this choice. “Fair” refers
to how regular and reasonable elections are, two concepts that stress the importance of an
objective and unbiased electoral process (Elklit and Svensson 2001, 203). While both are critical
to the international community’s perceptions of an election as being legitimate, freedom is more
important because it is the “precondition for democracy and for elections as a means to that end”
(Elklit and Svensson 2001, 203). Without freedom of elections, there can be no fairness. That
being said, the international community generally expects elections to be both free and fair.
Elections designated as such are deemedelections with integrity. These elections are “based on
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the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international
standards and agreements, and [are] professional, impartial, and transparent in [their] preparation
and administration throughout the electoral cycle” (Global Commission on Elections,
Democracy, and Security 2012, 13). Today, the majority of the global community shares the
expectation that elections are held with integrity.
Elections with integrity provide many benefits for the citizens of a country. When
elections are perceived as having integrity, they promote the ideals of democracy and individual
rights and encourage officials to run for election who are interested in promoting the values of
their citizens by providing a mechanism through which the public can hold officials accountable
(Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security 2012, 13). These intangible
qualities “can be a catalytic step towards realizing democracy’s transformative potential” and are
visible in more concrete forms as well (Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and
Security 2012, 13). Elections have played a major role in efforts towards “empowering women,
fighting corruption, delivering services to the poor, improving governance, and ending civil
wars” (Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security 2012, 13). Therefore, it is
important that support for elections with integrity is strong from both the perspectives of leaders
and officials, and from states’ citizens. Citizens must perceive that they are able to vote, that the
process will run smoothly, that their vote will count, and that there is transparency in the
electoral process so they can be confident these other conditions hold true. I focus on this idea of
citizen confidence as a factor crucial to elections and other elements of a state’s democratic
system since my studies and experiences have impressed upon me that without citizen support,
government and the institutions that support it are incapable of developing or maintaining a
healthy, functioning democracy (Birch 2008).
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Challenges to Democracy
Despite the popularity of the democratic ideal, challenges to democracy continue to exist.
“Commitment to democratic values is higher than ever,” (Diamond and Plattner 2001, xxvii) yet
public opinion surveys show a decrease in levels of satisfaction with democracy and its
institutions. Some scholars discuss the trend of decreasing confidence in democratic systems as
a “slump or even rollback of democracy globally” (Lindberg 2009, xvii). From 1974 to 2008,
there were 25 examples of breakdowns or reversals of democracy (Lindberg 2009, xvii). In
2009, the year marking the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, freedom declined
in 40 countries (Kelley 2012b, 3-4). According to Freedom House, since 2005 there have been
more states experiencing decreases in aggregate scores of political rights and civil liberties
rankings than states that depict gains in these scores (Puddington 2012, 30). Freedom House
analyzed the aspects of “government and accountability and public voice”, “civil liberties”, “rule
of law”, and “anticorruption and transparency” (Tucker 2012, 1) to assess democratic
governance in their 2012 study. Overall, there was a downward trend in the numbers reflecting a
decrease in democratic governance. One area that experienced an increase was a category falling
under the “accountability and public voice” data was free and fair electoral laws and elections
(Tucker 2012, 1). This shows that there is hope for utilizing elections as a way to increase voter
confidence in electoral efficacy and transparency as a way of strengthening the other areas of
democratic governance.
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Election Monitors and Voter Confidence
Free and fair elections can contribute to the development and conservation of quality
democratic institutions when a state’s citizens perceive the system as effective and the electoral
process as efficient. “For elections to have integrity, electoral justice must be done, and citizens
must see that it is done” (Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security 2012, 21).
One way to aid in citizens’ confidence and attempt to reassure citizens in their perceptions of
electoral efficacy and transparency is to monitor the electoral process. “Election observation is
the best-established, most visible, and often best-funded type of democracy-related assistance”
(Carothers 1997, 18). The increase in international election monitoring shows the interest of
individual states and the international community as a whole in the promotion of democracy, but
it is important that election monitoring also helps the populations within those states’ borders
feel more confident in the institutions and systems of their country’s government.

Characteristics and Roles of Election Monitors
Election monitors are often non-partisan bodies that observe states’ elections and report
about them. By doing so, monitors increase transparency in the electoral process and change the
incentives facing politicians involved in the elections by increasing the cost of cheating and
creating more benefits for being honest (Kelley 2012b, 10). Typically election monitors are able
to access elements of the entire electoral process, from campaigns and voter registration to
voting in the poll booths and counting the votes (Hyde 2011, 5). “Their core mission is to
uphold a shared set of electoral norms enshrined in a vast collection of international laws and
organizational documents” (Kelley 2009a, 767-768).
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Election monitors can enter a country and observe its elections only if invited by the
government of a state. This invitation serves as a formal agreement that gives the organization
the right to access various aspects of the election (Kelley 2009b, 59). The fact that so many
governments choose to invite monitors to their domestic elections is a form of acknowledgement
of the importance and relevance of the norm in the contemporary international system. It also
shows states’ desire to show the international community and their own citizens that their
country upholds a commitment to democratic principles and the voice of its citizens as being
crucial to elections. A state intentionally signals other actors that it is confident in the quality of
its elections and is committed to holding democratic elections (Hyde 2011, 61).
Monitors accomplish their mission by examining the electoral infrastructure, interviewing
politicians and election officials, studying pre-election campaigns, inspecting voter registration,
watching election rallies, reviewing media coverage of the election, observing the voting process
on election day, and producing reports that reflect their judgments throughout the electoral
process (Kelley 2012b, 39-40). Elklit and Svensson (2001) argue the importance of monitors’
assessments in regards to the freedom and fairness of elections. They stress the importance in
distinguishing the processes through which these concepts are evaluated and that the assessments
must occur before Election Day, during the voting process, and after Election Day (Elklit and
Svensson 2001, 203-205). Table 1.1, Elklit and Svensson’s “Checklist for Election
Assessment,” shows the qualities of elections which monitors should observe in order to
designate a country’s election as being free and fair. The authors claim that while this table is
useful and fairly thorough because of its basis on a wide range of literature, it cannot be
depended upon as the sole tool for categorizing elections. Different election monitors may focus
on the observation of certain phenomena listed in the table, while others are looking for the
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presence of all the criteria listed. Although the table is not comprehensive, it summarizes the
main factors of the electoral process that election monitors are attempting to assess, and is a
useful tool in aiding the understanding of election monitors’ missions.

Table 2.1—Checklist for Election Assessment
Dimension
Time Period

“Free”
Freedom of movement
Freedom of speech (for candidates, the
media, voters, and others)
Freedom of assembly
Freedom of association
Freedom from fear in connection with
the election and the electoral campaign
Absence of impediments to standing for
election (for both political parties and
independent candidates)
Equal and universal suffrage

“Fair”
A transparent electoral process
An election act and an electoral system that grant no special
privileges to any political party or social group
Absence of impediments to inclusion in the electoral register
Establishment of an independent and impartial election
commission
Impartial treatment of candidates by the police, the army, and
the courts of law
Equal opportunities for political parties and independent
candidates to stand for election
Impartial voter-education programs
An orderly election campaign (observance of a code of conduct)
Equal access to publicly controlled media
Impartial allotment of public funds to political parties (if
relevant)
No misuse of government facilities for campaign purposes

On Polling Day

Opportunity to participate in the election

Access to all polling stations for representatives of the political
parties, accredited local and international election observers,
and the media
Secrecy of the ballot
Absence of intimidation of voters
Effective design of ballot papers
Proper ballot boxes
Impartial assistance to voters (if necessary)
Proper counting procedures
Proper treatment of void ballot papers
Proper precautionary measures when transporting election
materials
Impartial protection of polling stations

After Polling Day

Legal possibilities of complaint

Official and expeditious announcement of election results
Impartial treatment of any election complaints
Impartial reports on the election results by the media
Acceptance of the election results by everyone involved

Before Polling Day

Source: Elklit and Svensson 2001, 204.
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It is important for monitors and observer groups to accurately report election strengths
and irregularities to ensure that the elections are legitimate. The neutrality of observers is crucial
in efforts towards ensuring the accuracy of observers’ assessments and decreases the chances
that monitors will legitimize a flawed election. As declared in the 2005 Code of Conduct on
election observation, “No one should be allowed to be a member of an international election
observer mission unless that person is free from any political, economic, or other conflicts of
interest that would interfere with conducting observations accurately and impartially” (Kelley
2012b, 75). Impartiality is one of the international community’s shared expectations of election
monitors, as is made clear from its repetition 8 times in the “Fair” column of Table 1.1.
While election monitors share the same mission, there are many elements that contribute
to a diverse range of types of monitors and the way they are involved in elections. First, the
electoral processes in a country are results of that country’s unique history, culture, and other
characteristics that make its elections distinguishable from the elections that take place in other
states, even its neighbors (United Nations 2012). Electoral systems around the world may be
structured differently due to “both colonial legacies and emulation behavior,” in addition to other
influences (Kelley 2012a, 206). The percentage of the population that registers to vote, the
number of political parties, the length of candidates’ campaigns, voting procedures, and many
other factors will vary from country to country and even within a country between elections.
Therefore, observers cannot necessarily generalize between elections in their evaluations. They
must consider the election “in the context of the specific democratic-transition process” (Elklit
and Svensson 2001, 206). This includes considering the election as fitting into the historical
timeline of the evolution of a country’s democracy through previous elections and evaluating
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whether the election in question is furthering a country’s progress towards a consolidated
democratic system.
Second, different organizations and monitoring missions will operate in different ways.
There are a variety of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that are involved in election monitoring. The United Nations (UN) was
one of the first organizations to become involved in monitoring elections as part of its approach
to peacekeeping. According to the UN, “electoral assistance is based on the principle established
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the will of the people, as expressed through
periodic and genuine elections, shall be the basis of government authority, while also
recognizing the principles of state sovereignty and the national ownership of elections” (United
Nations 2012). The Organization of American States (OAS), which became the first regional
organization to start monitoring elections in 1962, closely followed the UN in its involvement in
elections (Kelley 2009b, 61). Many IGOs, such as the European Union and the OAS, have strict
rules by which they must abide in producing their official assessments of elections (Kelley
2009a, 769). On the other hand, some NGOs, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI)
and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), do not have to deal with the same
types of restrictions as IGOs and can therefore act more freely in creating their election
assessments (Kelley 2009a). NGOs do not report directly to any government, so there are fewer
actors limiting their ability to produce their election reports (Kelley 2012b, 65). Due to
structural differences and differing goals between organizations, some may focus their attention
on observing various aspects listed in Table 1 (above), while others are more interested in
changing the cost-benefit analysis associated with the incentive structure for actors involved in
the election (Kelley 2012a, 207).
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If a government invites more than one organization to monitor its elections, those
organizations may cooperate or choose to work independently from one another, producing
separate assessments (Kelley 2009b, 59). Collaboration between organizations can allow for
broader coverage of polling stations and more legitimacy in the assessments they produce
(Kelley 2009b, 60). Working separately, organizations often compete for “resources, attention,
and influence,” and will even attempt to release their assessment of the election before other
organizations release their reports (Kelley 2009b, 61). The different assessments produced by
various monitoring organizations and the different approaches organizations utilize in the
monitoring process reflect the lack of specific, widely accepted guidelines that exist for monitors
to follow.
Despite the fact that international election monitoring is a phenomenon present in a
majority of countries, there is no international law in place to ensure the monitoring process is
carried out in a particular, uniform way, or that monitors hold elections to similar standards
(Misk 2010, 766). One of the first attempts to create a set of guiding principles for election
monitors was Larry Garber’s Guidelines for International Election Observing, published in 1984
by the International Human Rights Law Group (Bjornlund 2004, 131). A more recent effort that
is more widely recognized is the 2005 United Nations Declaration of Principles for International
Election Observation, which broadly defines standards of conduct for election monitors (Misk
2010, 767). While over two dozen supranational organizations have endorsed the Declaration, it
is so general in its description of the guidelines monitors should follow that it leaves all smallscale decisions up to the individual monitors, meaning there is still no uniform criteria to which
election monitors must conform (Misk 2010). One of the main elements of monitors’ reports
that interests the international community is the designation of elections as being free and fair.
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Yet, “the phrase ‘free and fair’ cannot denote compliance with a fixed, universal standard of
electoral competition: No such standard exists, and the complexity of the electoral process makes
the notion of any simple formula unrealistic” (Elklit and Svensson 2001, 211). Although there
may not be a simple formula, there can be elements of the process that are standardized, such as
the number of monitors present, how these monitors are accredited, the timeframe of the election
observation period, and what election monitors’ duties should entail (Misk 2010, 766). Even if
these elements are accounted for, election monitors may still produce differing assessments.
“There is no set answer to the question of how many specific shortcomings must be observed,
and how serious they must be, before an election can be called ‘not free and fair’” (Carothers
1997, 24). Monitors base their assessments upon phenomena they observe, so if two groups of
monitors witness different aspects of elections, they may evaluate the entire electoral process
differently.
Situational factors affect the outcome of monitors’ assessments as well. Monitors are
likely to endorse an election if the electoral process improved since the last election, even if the
overall quality of the electoral process is not as strong as other elections that monitor has
endorsed and may still be “substandard” (Kelley 2009a, 782). Monitors may also take conditions
such as pre-election violence into account when making their assessments. Often, when violence
precedes elections there will be post-election violence as well. Election monitors want to avoid
contributing to this violence, so they may adjust their reports so as to not spark any further
conflict (Kelley 2009a, 783). Clearly, there are a variety of factors that contribute to differing
assessments and types of monitoring processes for different organizations.
Due to the variety of types of monitors, levels of involvement in the electoral process,
and methods used to monitor the election, scholars find it difficult to broadly assess the influence
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of election monitors. There is no one indicator that points to high quality election monitoring.
Even in cases where organizations have created methods of evaluating free, fair, and competitive
elections, evaluations cannot apply consistently across all cases (Kelley 2012b, 13). Because of
this, it is important to develop an understanding of the history of election monitoring before
focusing more specifically on cases of countries’ elections to learn about the effects monitors
have on various aspects of the electoral process. In my study, I concentrate on election monitors’
effects on a country’s domestic population, since there is little value in having a democratic state
if that state’s citizens have no confidence in the system.

Voters’ Confidence in Electoral Efficacy
Despite the significance of understanding citizen confidence in the electoral process,
today’s literature lacks much focus on this topic. The literature that does exist focuses on
citizens’ confidence in political institutions generally, and examines this topic within the context
of mature democracies (Aydin and Cenker 2011, 232). It is important that more research is done
regarding citizens’ confidence levels in political institutions in emerging democracies since “the
stability and legitimacy of a fledgling democracy largely depends on citizens’ support” (Aydin
and Cenker 2011, 232). Scholars in the fields of international relations and political science are
much more likely to focus on legitimacy of elections than one of the factors that allows for that
legitimacy to exist—voter confidence in electoral efficacy and transparency. Minimal literature
examines “what is arguably the most obvious and most crucial legitimacy evaluation that
prospective voters make: How well the election in question is likely to be conducted” (Birch
2010, 1615). The importance of citizens’ confidence levels in their state’s electoral system goes
beyond measuring satisfaction with the outcome of the election. Much more significantly, the
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population’s evaluation of the electoral system will influence individuals’ decisions about
whether or not to vote (Birch 2010, 1602). When citizens do not have full confidence in the
electoral process of their country, voter participation levels will decline, violent protests can
break out, and citizen support for other political institutions can decrease (Birch 2008, 305).

Defining and Understanding Confidence
Confidence can be understood as a “general positive orientation toward a given set of
institutions,” (Aydin and Cenker 2011, 231) in the case of this study, the electoral system. There
are several explanations that contribute to citizens’ confidence levels in various aspects of
government. The first type of explanation is socio-cultural. This explanation attributes
confidence levels to factors unrelated to the political system; interpersonal trust, interest in
politics, civic participation, and opinions about the government that are not based upon
performance (Aydin and Cenker 2011, 232). A second type of explanation comes from a
citizen’s party or ideological affiliation. The third explanation is most relevant to this study—
performance (Aydin and Cenker 2011, 323). This explanation states that people will have
confidence in institutions that they perceive as functioning effectively. Scholars use
performance-based explanations most often to examine populations in developing democracies
(Aydin and Cenker 2011, 323). Party-based and ideological explanations are less applicable to
developing democracies since these institutions undergo changes that may change people’s
affiliations more often than in mature democracies (Aydin and Cenker 2011, 235). Another way
to evaluate the origins of citizens’ confidence comes from the “home team” hypothesis. Also
known as the “winner effect,” this concept indicates that voters who support the winning
candidate or party will have more trust in political efficacy than voters who do not support the
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winner of the election (Banducci and Karp 2003, 447; Anderson and Tverdova 2001, 323). If
my hypothesis holds true however, even “losers” in an election have increased levels of
confidence in the electoral system when election monitors are present.

Election Monitors’ Influence on Citizen Confidence
Election monitors’ reports can legitimize the results of the elections and the electoral
process itself by reassuring citizens and the international community that the process operated
freely and fairly. As suggested above, “for elections to have integrity they must be, and must be
perceived by voters as being, conducted competently in a professional, non-partisan manner”
(Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security 2012, 21). Citizens are more likely
to have this perception when the population suspects that there may be problems in the electoral
process, when election monitors are visibly present throughout a country, and when the
population is aware of why the monitors are there and the job they will be carrying out (Brancati
2012, 4).
Election monitors cannot impact citizens’ confidence levels in the electoral process
unless citizens trust the monitors themselves. As monitors’ presence and countries have
increased, media attention on monitors has grown, and their reputations have become more well
known. This allows citizens to have a better understanding of the election monitors in their
countries based on general information about the size of the monitoring mission, the individual
and country’s past experience with election monitors, and the way politicians discuss the
monitors (Brancati 2012, 10-11). Therefore, when the population trusts election monitors, these
monitors play an important role in bridging the gap between the electoral institutions and
citizens’ perceptions of electoral efficacy.
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Citizens’ confidence in the electoral process and the governmental institutions in their
country is crucial to strengthening the foundations upon which a mature democracy can be built.
Confidence levels in representative democracy as a whole serve as indicators, or “report cards”
that reflect the mindset of the population regarding the institutions that exist to serve the people’s
interests (Pharr, Putnam and Dalton 2001, 305). If a states’ populace does not have confidence
in the way the electoral process takes place, this “lack of trust in electoral institutions can erode
citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of other political institutions, [and] it can dent
international legitimacy” (Birch 2010, 1602). Despite the problems resulting from a lack of
confidence in the electoral system, this confidence does not guarantee that a democracy will be
successful (Birch 2008, 315). In fact, “democracies can persist for considerable time in the
absence of full support for electoral institutions on the part of substantial sectors of the
population” (Birch 2008, 315). Even so, democracies are much more likely to survive when the
population trusts the government and the political system (Anderson and Tverdova 2001, 322).
While citizens’ confidence levels cannot be the only measurement of how well a democratic
system or elements of it are functioning, it is undoubtedly an important indicator to consider
because of the implications that come along with these low confidence levels.
Since election monitors are, in accordance with their raison d’être, present during
elections in emerging democracies, they serve as an important symbol of stability in times that
are often volatile. The stability that election monitors provide goes beyond just providing
assurance to voters that their vote will be counted. Monitors’ presence can “encourage a wary
citizenry to take the electoral process seriously,” boost opposition parties’ confidence levels in
their hopes of running for office, and “help keep an electoral process on track when an
entrenched leader loses the election and then balks at giving up power” (Carothers 1997, 20).
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The possible benefits of monitors’ presence in a country span even further than the scope of the
electoral process, as “greater levels of government trust and efficacy lead to democratic stability
and economic security, while lower levels have the potential to destabilize a government and
create economic insecurity” (Atkeson and Saunders 2007, 655).

Moving Forward—Achieving Higher Confidence Levels
There are several ways states can change their elections to reflect higher voter confidence
levels. One approach can be to “level the playing field” (Birch 2008, 307) and increase
transparency in the electoral process. States can achieve this “level playing field” by reducing
electoral fraud and promoting electoral systems that represent the popular vote through
proportionate representation systems (Birch 2008, 307; Banducci and Karp 2003, 448). An
approach for states interested in encouraging higher levels of voter turnout is to increase
confidence in electoral efficacy, which in turn is possible by improving the conduct of elections
(Birch 2010, 1616). While Birch (2010) does not explicitly point to election monitoring as the
way to improve election conduct, election monitoring is the method that would be most
beneficial to increasing confidence levels in a state’s electoral process both domestically and
internationally.
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Conclusion
There is abundant research about the development of international norms, the work of
international election monitors, and the significance of citizen confidence levels. However, there
is no existing literature I have been able to find that combines all three of these areas to examine
how formal adherence to the norm of international election monitoring influences voters’
confidence levels. This study makes an effort to fill the gap in the literature by contributing to
the existing work in the field and encouraging more research to be done on the topic.

Hypothesis
Based on the existing literature, I hypothesize that formal government adherence to the
norm of international election monitoring promotes higher confidence levels among voters in
electoral efficacy and transparency. I will test this hypothesis in chapters four, five and six
through comparative case studies.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The goal of this study is to explore the relationship between the presence of international
election monitors in domestic presidential elections and levels of voter confidence in their
country’s electoral process. The research question guiding this study is, “does formal adherence
to the norm of international election monitoring lead to increased levels of voter confidence in
their domestic electoral process?” I focus on how the norm of international election monitoring
developed, how widely adherence to the norm is practiced, and if available data reflect higher
levels of confidence in the quality of presidential elections when monitors are involved. As
stated in the previous chapter, I hypothesize that adherence to the norm of international election
monitoring is likely to increase voter confidence in electoral efficacy and transparency in
presidential elections. In this chapter, I describe my research design and methodology. I begin
with my hypothesis and an arrow diagram that explains the correlation between the variables and
the expected outcome. I follow with a discussion of how I will operationalize my variables. I
then discuss my method, a comparative case study design using multiple within-case
comparisons for each of the cases. Lastly, I describe the process of selecting my cases.

Hypothesis and Expected Outcomes
I hypothesize that increased levels of adherence to the norm of international election
monitoring following its development leads to increased levels of voter confidence in the
efficacy and transparency of the domestic electoral process in presidential elections. Therefore
as depicted in Figure 2.1, I expect that in states where international election monitors are present,
citizens will perceive higher levels of efficacy and transparency in domestic presidential
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elections. If my hypothesis does not hold true, international election monitors will have negative
or no impact on voter confidence levels.
Formal adherence to norms of
international election
monitoring

+

Independent Variable
Figure 3.1:
Hypothesized Model

Levels of voter confidence in
efficacy and transparency of
domestic electoral process
Dependent Variable

Independent Variable: Formal Adherence to the Norm of International Election Monitoring

I use formal adherence to the norm of international election monitoring as the
independent variable in this study. Most literature discussing the evolution of norms discusses
“internalization” as one of the important steps in the normative life cycle. The term
internalization, however, suggests acceptance to the point where the norm has become second
nature and is no longer questioned (Kelley 2008; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). I would argue
that the norm of international election monitoring has not yet been widely internalized due to
states that continue to refuse to invite monitors to their elections, and states that invite monitors
but continue to cheat, showing a lack of acceptance of the norm. Therefore, I operationalize the
independent variable of formal adherence to the norm as the presence of international monitors at
elections by examining whether or not states invited monitors and whether monitors accepted
this invitation. I gather information about monitors’ presence in state elections through
organizations’ websites and publications, monitoring reports, and literature discussing elections
in states. Several of these organizations include the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the
Carter Center, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), The Research Group on the Democratic, Economic and Social Development of
Africa (GERDDES), and Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (la Francophonie).
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Dependent Variable: Levels of Voter Confidence in Efficacy of Domestic Electoral Process
Voters’ confidence in the electoral system is an abstract concept that cannot be perfectly
quantified. It combines several different factors, including voter turnout, evaluations of election
quality and integrity, freeness and fairness of elections, trust in political institutions, satisfaction
with democracy, and electoral efficacy through representation and accountability. Additionally,
the literature argues that higher levels of voter confidence are positively related to voter turnout
(Birch 2010). Therefore, I operationalize voter confidence levels by examining the levels of
these factors mentioned above in presidential elections. I use data from surveys conducted by
Afrobarometer when they are available, as well as examining monitors’ assessments of elections
and the literature surrounding specific elections in the selected cases.

Methodological Approach
In this study, I use a comparative case study approach to examine the relationship
between the variables. In a comparative case study, “cases are chosen for the presence or
absence of factors that a political theory has indicated are important” (Johnson and Reynolds
2012, 198). A comparative case study allows a researcher to examine a variety of data available
and analyzing it by controlling for the most significant variables discussed in the literature.
When case studies support a hypothesis, this method allows the researcher to look further into
the way the independent variable affects the dependent variable and explain how that
relationship is carried out (Van Evera 1997, 54). Additionally, the comparative case study
method “permits a deeper understanding of causal processes, the explication of general
explanatory theory, and the development of hypotheses regarding difficult-to-observe
phenomena” (Johnson and Reynolds 2012, 200). Voter confidence levels are challenging to
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observe because they are comprised of many different factors that all aim to capture an abstract
concept. While it can be challenging to argue that a change in the independent variable is what
affects the confidence levels being discussed, there are ways through which to minimize the
possible influences of extraneous factors. By using “a backdrop of fairly uniform case
conditions,” (Van Evera 1997, 52) the researcher is able to eliminate the effects of outside
variables on the relationship between the variables being examined in a particular study.
I use a congruence procedure—multiple within-case comparisons—to examine
presidential elections from 1990, when the norm of international election monitoring spread most
rapidly, to 2011, within the selected cases. “Cases allowing many observations are better test
laboratories because they allow more measures of congruence, and tests that rest on more
measures are stronger” (Van Evera 1997, 62). Tracing elections over time will help to analyze
why changes in the variables occur (Lipson 2005).

Case Selection
I choose to focus my study on elections in Africa because “some of the most interesting
and challenging material to study this topic comes from there” (Abbink and Hesseling 2000, 10).
International actors question the commitment of African leaders to democracy more than they do
in other regions of the world (Geisler 1993, 613). One reason for this is the fluctuating progress
that has been made in achieving democracy across the continent. Scholars still question the
future of elections and democracy in Africa. While some believe that African countries are
making slow but steady progress towards stable democratic systems, others believe that when the
international pressure to have a democracy subsides, “the African states will slide back into
political strife, dictatorship and military rule” (Adejumobi 2000, 71). I aim to provide further
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insight to democracy in Africa by examining citizens’ confidence levels in domestic presidential
elections in African states.
Kaarbo and Beasely (1999) suggest that factors such as culture, time period, and legal
system are dimensions to be considered when attempting comparability of cases in situations
where these factors might affect the dependent variable (380). In the case of this study, colonial
history is important. In West Africa, “more or less autonomous electoral commissions are thus a
tradition since independence in most anglophone countries […]; whereas electoral commissions
are a relatively new innovation in the francophone” countries (Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu and
Kambale 2011, 2). In an attempt to eliminate the influences of outside variables, I chose cases
with the same colonial history to eliminate antecedent variables caused by historical differences
of states left over from colonial times that could impact voters’ confidence levels. Elections held
in francophone countries at the end of colonization were still conducted under the French system,
whereas anglophone countries acted more independently in the organization of their elections
(Fall et al. 2011, 2-3). These differences have implications for how elections after independence
took place. Therefore, I limit my cases to states in francophone West Africa.
To select my cases, I began by compiling a list of the eight countries in francophone
West Africa. These states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, and Senegal. I then examined the history of elections in each of these states through
sources including Afrobarometer, the African Elections Database, and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) World Factbook, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Election Guide. I made sure that substantial information was available about the elections in
these eight countries. In selecting cases, it is important to consider data richness, because if large
quantities of data are not available for each case, the case study cannot effectively draw
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conclusions about the relationship between variables (Van Evera 1997). Mauritania and
Burkina Faso have very limited information available about their electoral histories.
Mauritania’s first president seized power in a military coup in 1989 and held flawed elections to
stay in power for two decades (Central Intelligence Agency 2013a). The country had one fair
election in 2007, and does not have enough available information for this study. Burkina Faso
has had the same president since he gained power in a military coup in 1987, so I ruled this
country out as well (Central Intelligence Agency 2013a).
I next looked at the information available about election monitoring missions being
present in the remaining six francophone West African countries by examining information from
election monitors such as the Carter Center, AU, NDI and la Francophonie, as well as
information in the CIA World Factbook and literature about monitors’ presence in countries’
elections. Because I wanted to study the effects of election monitors’ presence on voter
confidence levels, I picked three cases in which international monitors were present at all of the
presidential elections between 1990 and 2011. I selected one case where the elections have
consistently been regular, and the country is considered an electoral democracy and well on its
way to democratic consolidation. I wanted the second case to be another country that is
considered an electoral democracy, but which has not had as smooth of a transition to
democracy. In contrast to the other two cases of fairly successful democracies, I wanted the last
case to be a country that has an uncertain democratic future because of the obstacles it has faced
throughout its journey towards democracy. These cases in various stages of democratic
consolidation allow me to examine voters’ confidence levels in three countries with the same
colonial history that have taken different paths since their independence, and to examine the
impacts that international election monitors have had on the citizens of these countries and their
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perceptions of their electoral system. The three cases I selected are Benin—which has had a
representative government since 1989 and has held regular elections, some with irregularities,
since that date, Mali—which is an electoral democracy that has held regular elections despite
low levels of voter turnout, and was considered one of West Africa’s stronger democracies until
a military coup in March 2012, and Guinea—which had its first free and fair elections in 2010
after a long history of turmoil, dictatorships, and false promises of democracy (International
Foundation for Electoral Systems 2010a; Hyde 2011; Central Intelligence Agency 2013a;
Fomunyoh 2001).

Summary
In order to conduct a comparative case study with multiple in-case comparisons, I
selected three countries to use as my cases. I will examine the elections in Benin, Mali, and
Guinea between 1990 and 2011 to analyze how the presence of election monitors affected voter
confidence levels. In the next chapter I conduct my first case study.
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CHAPTER FOUR: INTERNATIONAL ELECTION MONITORS IN
BENIN’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Introduction
An essential element of the proper functioning of democracies that is often overlooked is
citizens’ trust in the democratic process and the institutions that comprise it. When citizens trust
the political system of their country to function properly, they are more inclined to be a
participatory member of the democratic process. “Political efficacy influences general political
trust” (Nunnally 2011, 925), so when voters feel that their voice can be heard in the political
arena through their vote, they are likely to feel more politically efficacious and therefore have
higher levels of trust in the political system. Because of this, it is important for the electoral
process to operate smoothly and in a manner that is perceived as legitimate and transparent by
citizens, parties involved, and the international community. “But even in countries that are
formally democratic, such formal trappings of democracy as free, fair and competitive elections
seem to be coexisting with the informal practices of clientelism, corruption, ethnic mobilization
and personal rule by largely unchecked presidents” (Houngnikpo 2011, 4). In the following
chapters, I will conduct three case studies to examine the presidential elections in Benin, Mali,
and Guinea, to test my hypothesis that the presence of international election monitors in
countries’ presidential elections increases voters’ confidence levels in the efficacy and
legitimacy of their country’s electoral process. By closely examining the history and unique
circumstances of each country’s elections, I will be able to evaluate the relationship between
international election monitors’ presence in a country and the citizens’ trust and confidence in
their system. I will examine data that speaks to electoral integrity—largely surveys of citizens’
opinions. After analyzing the results within each case study individually, I will study the data
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collectively so that I can draw a conclusion about the impact of formal adherence to the norm of
international election monitoring on voters’ confidence levels in the next chapter.

Historical Background
“In Africa, Benin is considered a model of democracy because it has successfully
established a democratic political system based on consensus” (Houngnikpo 2011, 4). Benin
became independent from its colonial power, France, on August 1, 1960. The country was called
the Republic of Dahomey at the time (Houngnikpo 2011, 6). For the next decade, Benin
experienced political unrest and a series of military coups. In 1972 Major Mathieu Kérékou led
a military coup and assumed rule of Dahomey (Dossou-Yovo 1999, 62-64). Kérékou’s MarxistLeninist regime came into power in October 1972 and ruled for 17 years (Houngnikpo 2011, 45). He set up a military national revolutionary council and later a national revolutionary
assembly that represented the people. In 1979, the assembly decided that Kérékou would be the
only presidential nominee, and elected him to the position in 1980. In 1989, Beninois rebelled
against the bankruptcy of the government, unpaid civil servant salaries, and claims of
government corruption that were running rampant. A series of demonstrations were held that led
to the start of Benin’s democratization process (Battle and Seely 2007, 4).
Despite some tumultuous times throughout its early years of independence, Benin
became acknowledged and respected as the first African country to smoothly transition from a
dictatorship to a multiparty system (Houngnikpo 2011, 6). Through that transition, Benin set in
motion Africa’s “Third Wave” of democratization and became widely recognized as one of
Africa’s beacons of hope for democracy on the continent (Battle and Seely 2007, 1).
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Independent Variable: Formal Adherence to the Norm of International Election Monitoring

I measure the independent variable of my study, formal adherence to of the norm of
international election monitoring by examining elections where governments invite international
monitors. The presence of national and international monitors in elections in Benin, as in other
emerging democracies, provides a sense of legitimacy to elections, which previously were
marked with risks of violent reactions such as protests and attempted coups. Citizens distrusted
elections based on the historical organization and administration of elections, which were neither
free nor democratic before 1991 in Benin (Adjahouinou 1994, 218). Therefore, Beninese needed
a reason to believe that the electoral process had changed, and that the results would really
reflect their votes.
Election monitors provided an opportunity for every party involved to take strategic
advantage of their presence. Kérékou hoped the monitors would provide credibility and
assurance of legitimacy to his victory. Opposition parties hoped that monitors would be able to
identify and overturn any election fraud that unfairly gave Kérékou power, and even justify a
coup if the elections failed to be impartial. Additionally, financial advisors in the government
were hopeful that if Benin’s elections were perceived internationally as legitimate by being
awarded a “certificate of democratic authenticity” (Adjahouinou 1994, 219), institutions like the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund would be more willing to lend financial support to
Benin that could help the country address its struggles with its balance of payments.
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Elections in Benin
In February 1990, under pressure from France and Benin’s civilians, leader Mathieu
Kérékou held a national conference that created a new constitution led to the installment of a
temporary civilian-led government that was dedicated to the promotion of democracy. The
country’s democracy has strengthened since 1990 (Houngnikpo 2011, 4). Benin held “relatively
free, fair, and transparent legislative and presidential elections” in March 1991 (Houngnikpo
2011, 5).
The national conference held on February 19, 1990 proved to be the start of a new era in
Benin’s history. The ruling party invited individuals of all economic and social levels to attend
the conference at Hotel PLM-Aledjo of Cotonou and to play a role in the restructuring of the
government. While these citizens wanted to implement changes, the government hoped that the
changes occurring would be superficial rather than structural so that the regime in power would
remain there. Through a national referendum, the parties involved drafted and approved a new
constitution (Houngnikpo 2011, 8). Maxism-Leninism was no longer Benin’s official ideology,
and real changes were set in motion, perhaps contrary to Kérékou’s initial intentions (DossouYovo 1999, 67).
The 1990 national conference appears to have encouraged a new type of relationship
between the military and the government, as the military has remained uninvolved in elections
since (Houngnikpo 2011, 5). The transitional government that was in power following the
national conference of 1991 was able to successfully address some of the problems relating to
corruption and economic issues that had been building over the years of less effective
government (Houngnikpo 2011, 9). On February 27, delegates to the conference elected
Nicephore Soglo as Prime Minister, a new position in the Beninese government (Dossou-Yovo
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1999, 68). With these changes in place, the government was able to pay salaries on time and reopen schools that had been shut down, and with some time and effort, was able to address greater
issues within the educational system, including the university curriculum (Houngnikpo 2011, 9).

The 1991 Elections
The first presidential elections took place in two rounds. Without a candidate winning a
majority of the votes in the first round of Benin’s presidential elections, a run-off election is held
(Battle and Seely 2007, 2). The two elections took place on March 10 and 24, 1991. Prime
Minister Nicephore Soglo was Kérékou’s biggest opponent, and ended up winning the election
(Houngnikpo 2011, 6). In contrast to the Maxist dictator Kérékou, Soglo represented “the urban
intellectual elite from the South” (Strandsbjerg 2000, 400). He was elected as the president and
was inaugurated on April 4, 1991 (Houngnikpo 2011, 9). President Soglo was a former World
Bank official, and served as the interim Prime Minister of Benin (Houngnikpo 2011, 9). Soglo’s
work in both of these positions helped guide his interest in reforming the economy of Benin and
steering it towards economic liberalization (Houngnikpo 2011, 9). Citizens hoped that he would
turn around Benin’s economy, but the CFA franc devalued by 50% in 1994, which wracked the
economy (Seely 2007, 196). Many Beninese perceived Soglo as arrogant, possibly due to his
lack of affiliation with any particular political party for the first year of his term (Houngnikpo
2011, 9). In October 1993, Soglo lost the majority of members of the National Assembly’s
support, making his presidency much more of a challenge (Houngnikpo 2011, 9-10). Soglo also
faced charges of nepotism, a harmful allegation in the period leading up to the 1996 election.
The government of Benin invited both international and national groups and
organizations to observe its 1991 presidential elections. La Commission Béninoise des Droits de
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l’Homme [Benin Human Rights Commission] (CBDH) was a domestic observer present at the
elections. Le Groupe d'Études et de Recherches sur la Démocratie et le Développement
Economique et Social [Research Group on the Democratic, Economic and Social Development
of Africa] (GERDDES), a non-partisan, pan-African NGO based in Benin, sent observers to the
elections as well. Other observers came to Benin from Côte D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Canada, the
United States, Germany, and France (Adjahouinou 1994, 220).

The 1996 Elections
Kérékou re-emerged in Benin’s political arena as the face of the opposition to Soglo
during his term. A slogan endorsing Kérékou during these elections reflected the link between
religion and politics in Benin: “In spite of the past 17 years, it is Kérékou that God has chosen
for this people” (Strandsbjerg 2000, 395). While Soglo won more support than Kérékou in the
first round of the 1996 elections held on March 3, Kérékou was able to win the second round
(Houngnikpo 2011, 10). Kérékou garnered almost 90% of the votes from Benin’s two northern
districts, where he was from, as well as around 50% of votes in the South, Soglo’s home region
(Strandsbjerg 2000, 400).
The government of Benin again invited international observers to its presidential
elections in 1996. In the first round of elections on March 3, there were many different observer
groups present. Several were sub-groups of Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, an
organization that works to unite the French speaking countries of the world through political
actions and other methods to achieve peace, sustainable development, and support for the French
language (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie 2013). The sub-groups included
l’Agence de coopération culturelle et technique [Agency for Cultural and Technical
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Cooperation] (ACCT), that had six experts who represented Canada, France, Gabon,
Madagascar, Senegal, and Togo, as well as l’Association internationale des parlementaires de
langue française [International Association of French Speaking Parliamentarians] (AIPLF), that
had three representatives who were from Belgium, Canada, and Burkina Faso. This team worked
with observers from several other organizations such as the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and GERDDES. The National Democratic Institute (NDI), chose to work
independently from the other observer groups and organizations. It sent an international election
observer mission comprised of 17 individuals. The members were election experts, political and
civic leaders, and experts in democratic development (National Democratic Institute 1996a).
NDI, like the other international delegations present, announced its purposes for being in Benin
“to demonstrate the international community’s continued support for the democratic process in
Benin,” (National Democratic Institute 1996a, 1) “to learn from the Beninese people about the
nature of their electoral process and its implications for the further consolidation of Benin’s
democratic institutions” (National Democratic Institute 1996a, 1), and to “underscore to the
Beninese public the need for credible elections that would strengthen the country’s nascent
democratic institutions” (National Democratic Institute 2002, 1). The monitors’ goal was not to
run the elections or decide the outcome. The consensus among the delegations of monitors was
that the elections were transparent, regular, and democratic (Organisation internationale de la
Francophonie, 1996).
In the second round of the 1996 elections that took place on March 18, many of the same
observer groups were present. ACCT and AIPLF worked under L’Agence de la Francophonie.
The election experts represented Cameroon, Belgium, France, Gabon, Togo, Canada, and
Senegal. The observers again were satisfied with the transparency and efficacy with which the
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elections operated, and the final results confirmed Kérékou’s victory (Organisation internationale
de la Francophonie, 1996). The Constitutional Court reviewed the 1996 electoral process and
confirmed its outcome, even though there had been claims of vote rigging and intimidation,
among other types of electoral manipulation on the part of Kérékou (Houngnikpo 2011, 10).
Kérékou’s presidential term beginning in 1996 was called “Kérékou II,” but did not prove
to be much different than his earlier time in power (Strandsbjerg 2000, 400). While Beninois
hoped that Kérékou would use his power to serve the people more than he had done during his
dictatorship, by May 1997 it became clear that this would not be the case. Prime Minister
Adrien Houngbédji withdrew his support for Kérékou in 1998 and resigned from his position
(Houngnikpo 2011, 11). There was growing dissatisfaction with Kérékou leading up to the 2001
elections because of declining living conditions and strained relations between the government
and workers (Houngnikpo 2011, 11).

The 2001 Elections
While the 1996 presidential elections were fairly clean, the 2001 presidential elections
were less so. There were 17 candidates vying for the presidency (Seely 2007, 197). There was a
boycott of the run-off poll by the main opposition candidates, resulting from dissatisfaction with
certain irregularities in the electoral process (Houngnikpo 2011, 6). When Kérékou came away
with a considerable lead in the first round of the election held on March 4, 2001, the Beninese
responded by challenging the results and accusing Kérékou of rigging the vote. The challengers
questioned the variation between the results found by the Elections Committee and the
Constitutional Court (Houngnikpo 2011, 11).
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The government of Benin again invited international election monitors in 2001. The
observers represented organizations including la Francophonie, APF, la Délégation aux Droits
de l’Homme et à la Démocratie [The Delegation for Human Rights and Democracy] (DDHD),
and le Bureau Régional pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest [The Regional Bureau for West Africa]
(BRAO), and came from Chad, Albania, Belgium, France, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Canada,
Lebanon, and Senegal. On March 4, the observers divided into six groups and visited about 200
voting sites to monitor the Election Day activities. When the results of the first round of
elections were announced, the first reaction was a verbal protest from Amoussou, the fourth
place candidate, who had received between 4% and 8% of the votes. The results varied between
those announced by la Commission Électorale Nationale Autonome [the National Autonomous
Electoral Commission] (CENA) and the Constitutional Court. Next, the runner-up, Soglo,
voiced his opinion that there were irregularities in the election. The Constitutional Court
disregarded Soglo’s complaints and set the date for the run-off election to be March 22
(Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, 2001).
Soglo refused to participate further in the election due to the ignored accusations of fraud
(Houngnikpo 2011, 11). Therefore, CENA and the Constitutional Court agreed to allow the third
leading candidate, Adrien Houngbédji, to participate in the runoff with Kérékou (Houngnikpo
2011, 11). Houngbédji turned down the invitation in an act of support and endorsement for
Soglo. The next candidate to whom the Commission turned was Bruno Amoussou, an ally of
Kérékou. In the runoff election, Kérékou came away with 84% of the vote, a result that was
highly contested and believed by few to be fair. On the day of the runoff election, the election
monitors split into five groups to visit voting stations as they had for the first round of elections.
The process was similar, yet there were several differences in the results, including a decrease in
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voter turnout, improvement in the transportation of election materials to the voting stations, and
an increase in the number of blank ballots. The monitors applauded the media’s involvement in
publicizing the elections and reemphasized the necessity of minimizing irregularities in the
voting process (L’organisation internationale de la Francophonie, 2001).
The 2001 re-election of Kérékou “amid allegations of massive fraud was resented by
many and seen as a fading shadow of democracy” (Houngnikpo 2011, 11). Kérékou’s second
term brought with it a worsening economic situation that in turn caused social turmoil. To the
relief of many Beninese, the constitution stipulates that the maximum number of terms an
individual is eligible to serve as president is two terms. That meant Kérékou could not serve
another term as president in the future. Former president Soglo was also ineligible to serve
another term because of a constitutional age limit placed on presidential candidates (Houngnikpo
2011, 12).

The 2006 Elections
At the end of his term, Kérékou announced he would be stepping down, an act which
dispelled many suspicions that the president would attempt to amend the constitution in the
hopes of pursuing a third presidential term (Houngnikpo 2011, 12). However, there were still
some issues casting doubt on the legitimacy of the upcoming electoral process. In 2005,
Kérékou announced that there were not enough funds to hold the 2006 presidential elections or
the 2007 local and legislative elections, and that the government would hold combined elections
in 2008 (Houngnikpo 2011; Seely 2007). This sparked a very public reaction, mobilizing
Beninese to call for “a national fund-a-poll” (Houngnikpo 2011, 12) with their own donations to
CENA (Seely 2007, 198). CENA moved forward with arrangements for the elections. Kérékou
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voiced his opinion publicly that he suspected there were already flaws with the operation of the
election, seemingly in an attempt to gain amnesty after his presidency ended (Seely 2007, 198).
After weeks of planning, the presidential elections were held in 2006, as was originally
scheduled.
The 2006 presidential elections were a slight interruption to Benin’s record of successful
democratic practice even though they were able to bring to power a new president (Houngnikpo
2011, 5-6). The elections included 26 candidates. One popular candidate was Thomas Boni
Yayi, the former director of the West African Development Bank. Many citizens perceived him
to be the “cleanest of the candidates” (Houngnikpo 2011, 12). Using the slogan, “Things can
change! Things will change! Things must change” (Houngnikpo 2011, 12) in his campaign, Yayi
dedicated himself to improving governance and the private sector during his presidency. The
economy proved to be the main issue for most of the candidates running. Corruption was
another focus in the elections, after the many accusations of patronage and nepotism during
Kérékou’s presidency (Seely 2007, 198).
There was a high turnout at the polling stations, with between 77% and 82% of registered
voters actually casting their votes (Seely 2007, 198). Yayi and Houngbedji were the candidates
with the most votes in the first round of elections. Voter turnout was lower in the run-off
election, with only 68%-70% of those registered casting a vote. After close results in the first
round, Yayi won the second round by a large margin (Seely 2007, 199). His opponent
acknowledged his defeat, and election monitors from organizations including the United Nations
(UN), la Francophonie, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
called the election free, fair, and transparent (Houngnikpo 2011, 12-13). Despite the
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irregularities at the beginning of the elections, they proved to effectively put a new president into
office in a democratic manner.
Yayi’s victory caused celebrations in one of Benin’s major cities, Cotonou, and gave
citizens a renewed hope for the future of their country and its governance. Yayi’s experience at
the West African Development Bank prepared him to help Benin achieve economic growth. He
also aimed to educate women, revamp agricultural production, improve health care, and
minimize the incidence of corruption (Houngnikpo 2011, 13).

The 2011 Elections
President Yayi set out to win re-election in 2011. His main competitor was expected to
be Adrien Houngbedji, but there were a total of thirteen other candidates. The 2011 elections
were delayed twice due to claims that voters’ names had been left off of the voter registration.
While originally intended to occur on February 27, the election was postponed and polls finally
opened on March 13, 2011(Organisation internatinale de la Francophonie 2011; Africa Research
Bulletin 2011, 18763). The elections revealed that despite the growth in democracy since
independence, Benin’s democracy was not mature and still remained fragile (Organisation
internationale de la Francophonie 2011, 3). Observers from ECOWAS and la Francophonie
were present during the 2011 elections. The members of the missions were from Burundi,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, France, Ghana, and Senegal (Organisation internationale de la
Francophonie 2011).
After the elections, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement declaring
that the first-round was “a testament to the patience and civic responsibility of the people of
Benin” (Africa Research Bulletin 2011, 18763). ECOWAS, however, issued a statement of
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“concern over the escalating tensions in some parts of the country after the announcement of the
provisional results by the Independent National Electoral Commission” (Africa Research
Bulletin 2011, 18763). Just three days after the elections, on March 16, hundreds of opposition
supporters held protests outside of the electoral commission in the belief that the commission
was not handling the election results in the proper methods. On March 21, the election results
were released and showed that President Boni Yayi had won 53% of the votes. With this
majority, no run-off election was necessary. The constitutional court confirmed these results, but
opposition supporters continued to make claims that the elections had been fraudulent (Africa
Research Bulletin 2011, 18763).

Dependent Variable: Levels of Citizens’ Confidence in the Electoral Process
“Citizens in Africa look towards elections as instrument of choice as well as change from
the past legacy of dictatorship and impunity by the rulers” (Alemika 2007, 1). When the
elections do not live up to citizens’ expectations, they are likely to lose trust in political
institutions, including the government and the electoral process itself, as well as reflecting a
decreased level of satisfaction with democracy in their country. The levels of trust in political
institutions are an “indirect measure of regime legitimacy which is expected to be affected by
the quality of election that brought the incumbent government to power” (Alemika 2007, 5). In
this section I use data from Afrobarometer, a non-partisan research group that conducts research
on social, political, and economic issues in Africa. The data was collected in surveys collected
in 2005, 2008, and 2011. I therefore use the respective data to reflect public opinion following
the 2001, 2006, and 2011 presidential elections in Benin. Public opinion data for elections in
Benin prior to 2001 was not available, so I analyze the results from the three most recent
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elections to draw a conclusion about the relationship between the presence of international
election monitors and citizens’ levels of trust in the legitimacy of the elections.
A prerequisite for success in any election is voter turnout. People will only go to the
polls on voting day when they feel that political participation is worth the opportunity cost of
sacrificing time away from the home, family, or job to cast a vote (Weatherford 1992). Benin
had fairly high levels of voter turnout in the 2001, 2006, and 2011 elections (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Voter Turnout
Did you vote in the last election?
2005
2008
2011
Yes
89%
91%
88%
No- decided not to
1%
3%
1%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005a; Afrobarometer 2008a; Afrobarometer 2011
The results shown in Table 4.1 show fairly consistent levels of voter turnout, with results ranging
only 3 percentage points from 88% to 91%. This high percentage shows that voters perceive
there to be some advantage to casting their vote because of their choice to participate in the
elections. Other possible responses to the survey question included that voters were prevented
from voting, could not find a polling station, or were not listed on the national registry. I chose
to only highlight “yes” and “no” responses that displayed a conscious decision to participate or
not participate in the elections to examine the trend in voter turnout over time. The highest result
was 91% of those surveyed who reported voting in the 2006 election. This is likely the result of
a successful election in 2001 that gave the population more trust in the system, therefore
providing incentive to participate in the next set of presidential elections. The problems with
delayed elections that started in 2006 and continued in 2011, along with the tension surrounding
the 2011 elections could explain the slight decrease in voter turnout results from the most recent
election.
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Another indicator of citizen’s trust in their country’s electoral system comes from their
support of democracy. Citizens are more likely to participate in the system if it is one that
promotes the type of government they feel would best serve the country. Table 4.2 shows that
from 2005 to 2011, democracy remained the form of government most supported by the
Beninese people. There was a leap in approval for democracy after the 2006 elections, from
70% preferring democracy in 2005 to 81% in 2008. Yayi’s election and promise for economic
and social development in Benin could explain this increase.
Table 4.2 Type of Government
What type of government is preferable?
2005
2008
2011
Democracy
70%
81%
76%
Non-democracy
6%
10%
15%
Doesn’t matter
9%
7%
9%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005a; Afrobarometer 2008a; Afrobarometer 2011
Table 4.3 shows citizens’ perceptions of the state of democracy in Benin at the time of
the survey. The responses show interesting patterns in the public’s view of democracy in their
country. In 2005 and 2008, only 1% thought that Benin was not a democracy. In 2011, this
grew to be 4% of the population who did not consider Benin a democracy. While a 3% increase
does not seem drastic, it seems unlikely that as a country spends more time developing its
democracy, the population perceives it to become less democratic. This could be attributed to
citizens’ changing perceptions of what qualifies a democracy and perhaps even rising
expectations of how democracy in Benin should function.
As shown in the table below, the percentage of people who perceived Benin to be a
democracy with major problems decreased from 2005 to 2008, but then increased slightly again
in 2011. Contrastingly, the number of people who viewed Benin as a democracy with minor
problems grew slightly in each round of the survey. The percentage of people who considered
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Benin a full democracy varied the most; from 20% in 2005, to 37% in 2008, back down to 27%
in 2011.
Table 4.3 State of Democracy
How would you describe the state of democracy in Benin today?
2005
2008
2011
Not a democracy
1%
1%
4%
Democracy with major
27%
18%
25%
problems
Democracy with minor
34%
39%
43%
problems
Full democracy
20%
37%
27%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005a; Afrobarometer 2008a; Afrobarometer 2011
While the majority of Beninese clearly want Benin to be a democracy and perceive it as
such, in order to understand their trust in political institutions, including the electoral process, it
is important to understand their satisfaction with democracy. Table 4.4 shows citizen’s levels of
satisfaction with democracy over time. Over the course of the survey rounds, the percentage of
those not at all satisfied with democracy in Benin remained under 10%. The percentage of
those not very satisfied with Benin’s democracy decreased from 26% in 2005 to 21% in 2008,
but increased again in 2011 to 31%. Those who identified as being fairly or very satisfied with
democracy in Benin increased from 2005 to 2008, but declined again between 2008 and 2011.
Table 4.4 Satisfaction with Democracy
How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Benin?
2005
2008
2011
Not at all satisfied
9%
7%
9%
Not very satisfied
26%
21%
31%
Fairly satisfied
31%
39%
40%
Very satisfied
17%
30%
20%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005a; Afrobarometer 2008a; Afrobarometer 2011
Narrowing the scope from satisfaction with democracy to satisfaction with the electoral
process, citizens were asked their preferred method of choosing leaders. Table 4.5 shows that in
2005, 94% of those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that leaders should be chosen through
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elections. In 2008, 80% agreed or strongly agreed, and in 2011, 92% agreed or strongly agreed.
These results show that a strong majority of the population favors democratic elections to
alternative methods of selecting leaders.
Table 4.5 Electing Leaders
Statement A: We should choose our leaders through regular, free, and fair elections.
Statement B: Because elections can produce bad results, we should adopt another method of
choosing leaders.
2005
2008
2011
Strongly agree with A 90%
43%
71%
Agree with A
4%
36%
21%
Strongly agree with B 3%
8%
4%
Agree with B
2%
12%
6%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005a; Afrobarometer 2008a; Afrobarometer 2011
In order to evaluate citizens’ trust in the electoral system, it is important to understand
their perceptions of how elections operate. One way this can be quantified is by examining their
level of trust in the National Electoral Commission (CENA) in Benin. CENA is responsible for
the administration of elections, so feelings of satisfaction with and trust in the electoral process
often stem from how much the population trusts CENA. As shown in Table 4.6, while levels of
trust in CENA decreased from 2005 to 2008, they increased in 2011. However, the levels of
trust remained relatively low, with only 54% of those surveyed expressing trust on some level in
CENA. If my hypothesis holds true, the presence of international election monitors would
increase citizens’ trust in the electoral process despite the relatively low levels of trust in the
electoral commission.
Table 4.6 Institutional Trust
How much do you trust the National Electoral Commission?
2005
2008
2011
Not at all
23%
28%
18%
Only a little
23%
29%
26%
Somewhat
14%
28%
25%
A lot
23%
16%
29%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005a; Afrobarometer 2008a; Afrobarometer 2011
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The main measure of citizens’ confidence in Benin’s presidential elections comes from
their perceptions of the freeness and fairness of the elections. Table 4.7 shows the perceived
freeness and fairness of elections. When polled in 2005 about the freeness and fairness of the
2001 elections, only 3% of those surveyed voiced that the elections were not at all free and fair.
16% felt that the elections were free and fair with major problems, and 30% agreed but thought
the problems were minor. 44% of those surveyed thought the elections were completely free and
fair. In 2008, when asked about the 2006 presidential elections, the percentage of those who
perceived the elections as neither free nor fair decreased to 1%. The perception of the elections
as free and fair with major problems also decreased, by 8%. More people expressed the opinion
that the elections were free and fair with minor problems in 2008 than in 2005. There was also an
increase in the percentage of people who rated the elections as being completely free and fair,
from 44% to 51%. In 2011, there was a major increase in the percentage of individuals surveyed
who rated the elections as not free and fair from 1% to 11%. The percentage who rated the
elections as free and fair with major problems also increased, while the percentage of ratings
describing the elections as free and fair with minor problems decreased to 22%, lower than in
either 2005 or 2008. The ratings labeling the elections as completely free and fair increased
slightly from 2008 to 2011, from 51% to 52%.
Table 4.7 Freeness and Fairness
How would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?
2005
2008
Not free and fair
3%
1%
Free and fair with major problems
16%
8%
Free and fair with minor problems
30%
37%
Completely free and fair
44%
51%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005a; Afrobarometer 2008a; Afrobarometer 2011

2011
11%
12%
22%
52%

These results show mixed phenomena. While the percentage of citizens surveyed who
responded that the elections were completely free and fair increased from 2005 to 2011 by 8%,
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the percentage of those who rated the elections as neither free nor fair also increased by 8%.
Over the six year period between surveys, the percentage of people who rated the elections as
free and fair with major problems decreased by 4%, and the responses describing the elections as
free and fair with minor problems decreased by 8%. 2008 was the year in which the results were
highest in recording the elections as either completely free and fair or free and fair with minor
problems, with 88% responding in these categories. In both 2005 and 2011, the results in these
two categories of ratings equaled 74%. It is promising for the future of democracy in Benin that
over 50% of those surveyed responded that the 2006 and 2011 elections were completely free
and fair, but less promising that the percentage of people who categorized the election was not
free or fair in 2011 was 11%.
Table 4.8 below shows various ratings of democracy in Benin over time. In 2011, those
surveyed were asked to reflect upon the level of democracy in 2011, in 2001, before 1990, and
where they want Benin’s democracy to be in the future. Using a scale from one to ten,
respondents rated the level of democracy. I compiled the responses and grouped them into two
categories; I considered results under 5 to be signs of nonexistent, limited, or weak democracy,
and results 5 and over as strengthening or strong democracy. 86% of respondents quantified
democracy in Benin in 2011 as a 5 or over. 70% described democracy in Benin in 2001 as a 5 or
over. When asked about Benin under one party rule before 1990, only 13% rated it as a 5 or
over, while 83% rated it fewer than 5. When asked about where they want Benin’s democracy to
be in the future, 94% responded with a 5 or higher, and only 1% gave an answer under 5. These
answers show a clear progression in Benin’s democracy, especially from 1990 to 2011. While
there are many factors that could have contributed to the 16% increase in perceptions of
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democracy between the elections in 2001 and 2011, one possible explanation could be the
presence of international election monitors as a legitimizing force behind the process.
Table 4.8 Democracy in Benin
On a scale from 0-10 where 0 is completely undemocratic and 10 means completely democratic,
where would you place the following:
Level of Democracy
Today (in 2011)
Benin in 2001
Benin under one party rule
before 1990
Where you want the
country to be in the future
Source: Afrobarometer 2011

Total Under 5
14%
30%
83%

Total 5 and Over
86%
70%
13%

1%

94%

Conclusions
The Afrobarometer surveys did not directly ask about trust in international election
monitors, so it is impossible to conclusively determine that changes in citizens’ levels of trust in
the elections were caused by election monitors. Much of the data shows that confidence in
democracy and the elections in Benin was higher in 2008 than in 2005 or 2011, showing that the
effects of the 2006 elections had a strong impact on citizens’ perceptions of democracy during
the period following the elections. The 2011 data was collected in June and July of 2011
(Afrobarometer 2011), so citizens may not have had time to fully understand the impact of
President Yayi’s election or reflect upon the electoral process that took place merely months
before the survey was given. Election monitors, including many monitors from the same
organizations, were present at the 2001, 2006, and 2011 elections. While their presence during
presidential elections was constant, citizens’ perceptions of the freeness and fairness of elections,
along with their satisfaction with democracy was not constant.
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It is possible that citizens’ changing perceptions of the characteristics and capabilities of
monitors present in the elections impacted their conclusions about Benin’s electoral process.
Brancati (2012) writes that the mandates and ability of monitors to carry out their mandates are
the two factors most relevant to citizens’ perceptions of the monitors (6). Since representatives
from organizations such as la Fracophonie were present at all three of the elections included in
the survey data, and even elections before survey data was available, it is likely that citizens
gained trust in the capabilities of the monitors as well as an understanding of their mandate by
the 2011 elections. The increasing levels of satisfaction with democracy, trust in CENA, and
perceptions of freeness and fairness in elections suggest that the presence of monitors during the
elections was a factor in this increase. The decreasing levels between 2006 and 2011, however,
do not support my hypothesis that formal adherence to the norm of international election
monitoring increases citizens’ confidence in the efficacy and transparency of the electoral
process.
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNATIONAL ELECTION MONITORS IN
MALI’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Historical Background
Mali was a French colony from the 1890s until 1960 in what was then called French
Sudan. 1945 marked the beginning steps of the democratization process in the country. The
French allowed the African citizens to vote in the elections that year (Lange 2000, 230). Since
the French did not gain many financial benefits from the territory, they had little interest in
investing too many resources into the development of the colony. When the French were leaving
in 1950, they encouraged Modibo Keita, the leader of Mali, and Leopold Senghor, the leader of
Senegal, to form the Mali Federation for consolidation in the political and economic arenas of
governing the region. On June 20, 1960, the federation became officially independent from
France. In August of that year, Mali and Senegal declared their independence from one another,
and on September 22, the state was officially named the Republic of Mali (Clark 1995; Lange
2000). Modibo Keita became Mali’s first president. He ruled the state through a one-party,
socialist system. Due to a depressed economy and low standards of living, Lieutenant Moussa
Traoré led a military coup in 1968 to overthrow Keita. Most Malians were ready for a change in
governance because of the many problems that resulted from Keita’s rule (Clark 1995, 207-209).
General Moussa Traoré led a military dictatorship government in Mali from November
1968 until he was overthrown in a popular revolution in March 1991. The economic situation
had not improved much, meaning that people were still living in poor conditions. Other
problems included corruption, repression of political opposition, and violence during student and
labor protests (Clark 1995, 210). There was again dissatisfaction with the regime and pressure
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for a change to be made. “People were weary of the old dictatorship, which like many in Africa
was vaguely Marxist-Leninist in organization; further, the demise of communism in the Soviet
Union had destroyed whatever legitimacy such regimes still had” (Pringle 2006, 32). Thousands
of citizens took to the streets and called for the installation of a multiparty system (Gorée
Institute 2009; Camara 2011; Freedom House 2011a). The riots resulted in the deaths of
between 50 and 200 rioters killed by armed forces and the violence surrounding the
demonstrations in the capital city alone (Clark 1995). Lt. Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré
(popularly known as ATT) led the coup d’état that arrested Traoré and overthrew him (Freedom
House 2011b). After the pro-democracy forces ejected Moussa Traoré from power, ATT handed
power over to a transitional government that lasted a year, called the Transition Committee for
the Well-Being of the People (CTSP) (Pringle 2006, 32; Clark 2005, 213). CTSP announced that
it would be taking steps to move Mali towards democracy by holding a national conference to
create a new constitution and create a plan for election procedures (Clark 2005, 213-214). At the
end of the year in 1991, Mali held its national conference that lasted a few weeks and resulted in
a new constitution, an electoral code, and the charters of political parties (Camara 2011, 78;
Pringle 2006; Clark 2005, 214). Alpha Oumar Konaré from the Alliance for the Democracy in
Mali (ADEMA), the largest of Mali’s 70 some political parties, was elected to be the president in
June 1992 (Gorée Institute 2009, 251; Freedom House 2011a). Since then, leaders in the
government have promised to help Mali to develop its democracy (Camara 2011,79).
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Independent Variable: Formal Adherence to the Norm of International Election Monitoring

I again measure the independent variable of my study, the spread of the norm of
international election monitoring, by observing governments’ adherence to the norm through the
invitation of international monitors to their presidential elections. If my hypothesis holds true,
and the presence of international election monitors during presidential elections does in fact
increase citizens’ levels of confidence with the electoral process in their country, it would be
beneficial to both Mali and other countries struggling to consolidate their democracy to know the
important impact that monitors can have on citizens’ attitudes and outlooks.
Democracy in Mali did not immediately produce results that improved quality of life, so
after about 15 years without much noticeable difference, many Malians felt frustrated with the
system. “On the international scene, Mali continues to benefit from its reputation as a young and
exemplary democracy. However, the lack of transparency and integrity in public and economic
management is feeding frustrations” (Rhazaoui 2010, 7). These frustrations are an important
reason that Mali’s government invited international election monitors in the past and continues to
do so today.
When questioned about the meaning of democracy in a 2005 survey, 75% of people
surveyed understood the meaning of democracy in French, 17% of people needed “democracy”
to be translated into another language to understand its meaning, and 7% of people did not
understand the word or the question in either French or a national language (Afrobarometer
2005b). This shows that in 2005, democracy was visible and near the forefront of people’s
minds, but was not fully integrated into society.
“Mali’s democracy is moving slowly and while the mentalities of people are gradually
changing, it has not always been in good ways” (Camara 2011, 87). However, it is clear that
Malians are trying to move towards stronger democracy and have the intentions to address the

68
factors that have put a strain on democratic consolidation. In the rest of this chapter, I examine
the presidential elections in Mali from 1990 to 2011, the roles that international election
monitors played in these elections, and the impact, if any, that these monitors had on citizens’
attitudes towards the electoral system.

Elections in Mali
Mali is an electoral democracy in which the president is elected by popular vote and can
hold one or two five-year terms (Freedom House 2011a). All Malian adults over the age of 18
were automatically registered to vote after a 2002 consensus. Individuals who turned 18 after the
census had to register themselves (Freedom House 2011a). Three organizations work together to
run the elections by organizing the polls, establishing the electoral rolls, and overseeing the
election (Camara 2011, 77). These agencies are the Independent National Election Commission
(CENI), the General Delegation to Elections (DGE), and the Territorial Administration. CENI
oversees the elections as a domestic monitoring body made up of members from majority and
opposition parties, religious groups, and NGOs including human rights organizations (Freedom
House 2011a).
Citizens are free to express their opinions and support the political party of their choice,
even if it is not the majority party. While there are 113 registered political parties in Mali, only
14 of them have much of a voice in the governance of the country, as they hold seats in the
National Assembly (Freedom House 2011a). It is clear that Mali has established democratic
institutions, but is still struggling to fully embody the democracy that these institutions could
support. In a 2005 survey, Malians were asked how well elected officials reflect the opinions of
voters. 15% said not at all well, 26% said not very well, 41% said well, and 9% said very well
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(Afrobarometer 2005b, 49). While these results reflect some confidence in the effects that voters
have in selecting leaders and getting their voice heard in the political arena, only 50% of those
surveyed felt as though the elected officials actually represented their opinions. This percentage
is fairly low and the perception that elected officials will not sufficiently represent their
constituents could be a reason for lack of confidence in the electoral process. Despite these
problems, Mali has proven to the international community that it is able to function effectively as
a democracy. As is the case in many emerging democracies, Mali has struggled, but overall,
“Mali’s electoral track record since 1991 has been just messy enough to suggest that the
country’s democracy is genuine, not the creation of one strong, quasi-permanent leader in the
background” (Pringle 2006, 32). In the following sections I examine the specific events and
atmosphere surrounding elections in Mali from 1992 to 2011 to evaluate the role that monitors
played.

The 1992 Elections
The 1992 presidential elections were the first multiparty elections in Mali. They took
place after a referendum passed on January 12, 1992 approved Mali’s new constitution that was a
by-product of the national conference. The first round of presidential elections occurred on April
12, 1992 with nine candidates on the ballot. 48 official political parties existed in Mali at this
time (Lange 2000, 237-239). In the run-off election on April 26, the two candidates who had
received the most votes in the first round competed for the presidency (Lange 2000, 236; Clark
2005). Alpha Oumar Konaré won 69.01% of the votes, while Tiéoulé Mamadou Konaté won
30.99% (Gorée Institute 2009, 257). Konaré represented ADEMA, and was a leader within the
party. ADEMA was well known in both rural and urban areas of the country, and Konaré made
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sure to make the most of this by campaigning in both rural towns and urban areas, while other
candidates underestimated the importance of the more remote towns. Konaré was inaugurated
on June 8, 1992 (Clark 2005, 216).
The forty international election monitors who were present, and who represented a
variety of different countries and organizations, unanimously agreed that the elections were free
and fair. However, the Malian media suggested that the observers were not very involved in the
electoral process, meaning the validity of the monitors’ reports was called into question (Lange
2000, 236).

The 1997 Elections
“Despite the judicial structure put in place, the 1997 elections took place in a sphere of
utmost confusion and in a tense climate where fears of a violent outbreaks [sic.] were often
expressed” (Lange 2000, 242). Some of the problems were related to difficulties in setting up an
electoral register. The first round of the presidential elections was supposed to take place on
May 4, but instead was delayed until May 11 because of these difficulties. Another
distinguishing feature about the presidential elections in 1997 was that the Collective of
Opposition Political Parties, a coalition of opposition parties, boycotted the elections. Only one
candidate ran against the incumbent, Alpha Oumar Konaré (Gorée Institute 2009, 257).
Voter participation was low in 1997, just as it had been in 1992. Only 28.41% of voters
participated in the presidential elections. Konaré was reelected as president in the first round of
elections since he won the majority of the votes (Lange 2000, 243). No run-off election was
necessary.
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La Francophonie sent an observer mission to this election. The members were from
Canada, France, Guinea, Madagascar, Senegal, and Mauritania. Other international election
monitors represented GERDDES Afrique and the Pan-African Observatory for Democracy
(OPAD), and monitors from Sweden and Norway. On May 11, 1997 the election monitors split
into five different teams and covered four different regions throughout the country. They visited
over 250 polling stations. La Francophonie reported that voting took place peacefully and
without disruption. They also noted that the counting of the votes was transparent. The
observers claimed that the first round of presidential elections were an improvement from the
legislative elections that had occurred just a few months earlier, in April. Overall, the observers
from la Francophonie concluded that the elections were lawful, despite a few irregularities
(Organisation internationale de la Francophonie 1997).

The 2002 Elections
The 2002 elections were viewed as being much freer and fairer than the 1992 and 1997
elections. This year marked the important transition of power from President Alpha Oumare
Konaré’s two terms to a new leader (The Carter Center 2002a). Many more political groups were
involved in the 2002 elections than had been present during the 1997 elections. In the first round
of elections, held on April 28, 2002, 24 candidates competed for the presidency (The Carter
Center 2002a, The Carter Center 2002c). Amadou Toumani Touré, a former military officer
who had ruled in the transition period after Traoré’s dictatorship, was elected in this year, and
helped to strengthen Mali’s democracy in the period after the elections (Freedom House 2011a).
Representatives from la Francophonie, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the
Carter Center monitored the 2002 presidential elections. The monitors came from Switzerland,
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Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, France, Gabon, Senegal, Niger, and Cameroon. The monitors’ reports
stated that the voting process took place without major incident. The Carter Center (2002a)
remarked that, “the elections were peaceful, well managed, and conducted in a spirit of
transparency.” Their monitoring delegation was not large, so the Carter Center did not have
observers present in voting sites throughout the country. The Carter Center collaborated with the
other international and domestic election observers, as well as representatives of political parties
and voters themselves to learn more about Mali’s electoral process (The Carter Center 2002a).
In the first round, the observers noted some irregularities in the form of an absence of
voting cards available, missing election materials, and delays in the opening of polling stations.
The Carter Center noted with appreciation the domestic observers from CENI who were present
at most of the polling stations. The Center assessed that a quicker release of results would have
decreased levels of suspicions about surrounding the announcement of results (The Carter Center
2002a). However, despite suspicions, the recognition and acceptance of the results by the third
place candidate Keita and other opposition candidates contributed to success in the next round of
elections (The Carter Center 2002b).
In the lead up to the second round of elections, opposition parties filed complaints to the
Carter Center officials that ADEMA affiliates were stealing voter cards and forging electoral
materials (The Carter Center 2002b). Touré ran against Cissé in the run-off elections. On
Election Day, the Center’s monitors observed Malians being permitted to vote without any
identification of any form (The Carter Center 2002b). Monitors also noted that there was a
smaller turnout over voters in this second round of voting. 38.31% of registered voters cast their
vote in the first round of elections, and only 30.17% in the second round (Organisation
internationale de la Francophonie 2002). The Constitutional Court announced the final results of
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the elections on May 23, 2002 (The Carter Center 2002b). Despite the low turnout of voters and
minor irregularities, the second round of elections operated more smoothly than the first and
international monitors confirmed that Touré won with 926,243 votes, 65.01% of the total votes,
while Soumaïla Cissé had 498,503 votes, or 34.99% (Organisation internationale de la
Francophonie 2002; The Carter Center 2002c; Gorée Institute 2008, 258). Election observers
from the Carter Center (2002b) commented that it was apparent that Malians as well as the
international community viewed Touré with a sense of legitimacy.
The Carter Center (2002c) noted, “The impressive election observation and parallel vote
tabulation undertaken by CENI was of limited immediate value, as CENI findings were not made
public. CENI should review how best it might fulfill its mandate to supervise the conduct of the
elections” (30). This suggests that while CENI, as a domestic monitoring body, plays a role
similar to international election monitors, but they do not impact citizens’ confidence levels or
the perceptions of legitimacy of the international community as much as international monitors
are able to because the reports and findings from elections are not published for the public to see.
One recommendation for improvement is that “the future role of domestic election observers
may be enhanced through capacity building, training, and ongoing international and domestic
support to facilitate observation of all aspects of the election process” (The Carter Center 2002c,
34).

The 2007 Elections
In 2007, Amadou Toumani Touré was in power, and seven candidates ran against him.
Touré had strategically used the period of time leading up to the elections to start a number of
development projects and initiatives that would improve his image among the Malian people.
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These projects involved improvements to infrastructure, health care, and housing in Mali
(Camara 2011, 82).
Touré was backed by Alliance pour la Démocratie et le Progrès [Alliance for Democracy
and Progress] (ADP), a coalition of 15 political parties and associations (Camara 2011, 77;
Freedom House 2011a). Other coalitions and parties backed the other seven candidates. In the
period leading up to the 2007 elections, many felt as thought Mali was operating under a singleparty system since there was less national opposition than in the past (Camara 2011, 79).
Opposition parties had a weaker presence, and there was even less opposition in the parliament.
This meant that the so-called checks and balances to the president’s executive power were
limited and citizens began voicing concern over the issue of ATT’s solitary authority over Mali’s
government. This frustration was not only directed at the president himself, but also at
democracy in Mali more generally, as people felt that democracy had been unable to produce the
results they were expecting (Camara 2011, 80).
Malians went into the 2007 elections with the sentiments of frustration with democracy
that stemmed from ATT’s monopoly on governmental power. However, it was ATT who won
the first-round of elections by receiving 71.2% of the votes. The other candidates were
dissatisfied with the election results and claimed that there was fraud (Gorée Institute 2009, 259;
Camara 2011, 78; Freedom House 2011a).
Front pour la Démocratie et la République (FDR), a coalition, requested that the results
of the 2007 elections be declared invalid because of the fraud involved. They accused ATT of
campaigning before the constitutional campaign period and stuffing the ballot boxes among other
charges. The Constitutional Court refused to consider the complaints filed by the opposition and
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decided not to annul the election results because more than five days had passed since the
election, so the designated period for complaints had passed (Camara 2011, 83).
The final results of the elections were published on May 16, 2007 and the European
Union (EU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among other
international institutions, labeled the elections as free and fair (Camara 2011, 84). The 2007
election proves that Mali could be “recovering from voter apathy,” as voter turnout rates were
higher than in the past (Camara 2011, 86). It also shows that democracy in Mali needs
participation in elections to survive. The 2007 election is a sign of Mali’s maturing democracy,
as it operated without significant problems despite the public’s sentiments of frustration, and
occurred with less accompanying violence than did previous elections (Camara 2011).

Dependent Variable: Levels of Citizens’ Confidence in the Electoral Process
I examine Malians’ perceptions of democracy in their country, satisfaction with this
perceived democracy, levels of trust in political institutions, and judgment about the most recent
presidential elections in order to draw conclusions about citizens’ changing levels of confidence
in the electoral process. I use survey data from Camara (2011) for voter turnout, as well as
Afrobarometer data that were collected in 2002 (published in 2004), 2005, and 2008. I use this
data to reflect citizens’ opinions on the elections preceding the collection of results for each of
the surveys. Therefore the data will be a representation of Malians’ perceptions and attitudes
following the 1997, 2002, and 2007 presidential elections.
Voter turnout for elections in Mali is and has been low. Meager participation rates have
been a problem in Mali since the 1992 elections, as can be seen by the low percentage of
registered voters who voted in the elections depicted in Table 5.1 below (Camara 2011, 85).
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“The reason for this lack of enthusiasm, the indifference and the disinterest of Malians to the
vote, is their lack of confidence in political leaders and candidates because they know the feeling
that their votes have neither meaning nor relevance because ‘the dice is cast’ in advance”
(Camara 2011, 81). If my hypothesis holds true, international election monitors’ consistent
presence at elections should increase citizens’ confidence levels in the electoral process despite
their lack of confidence in other institutions involved, because of the idea that international
monitors give the elections external validity and legitimacy. This could be one way to interpret
the results in Table 5.1, which shows slow yet substantial increases in the percentage of voters
who participated in elections from 1992 until 2007. The initial increase between 1992 and 1997
likely reflects the widespread interest in contributing to the democratic process that had started
out successfully in the 1992 elections. Malians had time to adapt to the idea of participating in
elections, and may even have been aware that observers would be present at the elections.
Between 1997 and 2002 there was only a 0.7% increase in voter turnout. This reveals citizens’
reactions to the flaws with the 1997 presidential elections. Many voters were probably not
satisfied with the selection of candidates in 1997 and assumed they would encounter similar
problems in 2002. Another possibility is that participants in the 1997 elections felt as though
their voice had not been reflected in the outcome of the elections, so they could not justify taking
the time to go vote when their vote would not make a significant contribution to the outcome of
who became president. Between 2002 and 2007, there was an increase of just over 6% in voter
turnout (Camara 2011). This increase is notable because it shows how the smooth electoral
process in 2002 that was monitored by three reputable organizations created greater interest in
voting in the next presidential elections.
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Table 5.1 Voter Turnout
1992
Presidential
21.61%
Elections
Source: Camara 2011, 86

1997
29.2%

2002
29.99%

2007
36.24%

Despite the levels of voter participation being low in Mali’s presidential elections,
especially when compared to Benin’s voter turnout of between 80% and 90%, Malians do have a
clear desire for democracy in their country. The results below in Table 5.2, taken from the
Afrobarometer data collected in 2002, 2005 and 2008, reflect the percentages of people who said
democracy is preferable over any other type of government, those who said a non-democratic
government is preferable, and those who had no preference. In each year, around 70% of those
surveyed said democracy was the type of government they preferred. The percentage of
respondents with this answer decreased slightly after the 1997 elections and then increased again
after the 2002 elections (as seen in the 2004 and 2005 columns below). As with voter turnout in
Table 5.1 above, these results reflect a decrease in confidence in democracy after the
controversial 1997 elections, then a resurgence in confidence in democracy following the 2002
elections that functioned much more smoothly. While there were international election monitors
present during both of these elections, the monitors present at the 1997 elections had minimal
complimentary remarks about the overall electoral process. Monitors present at the 2002
elections had much more positive contributions to give in their reports about both rounds of the
elections.
Table 5.2 Type of Government
Which type of government is preferable?
2004
2005
2008
Democracy
71%
68%
72%
Non-democracy
12%
18%
12%
Doesn’t matter
15%
12%
13%
Sources: Coulibaly and Diarra 2004, Afrobarometer 2005b, Afrobarometer 2008b
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Table 5.3 shows Malians’ perceptions of the level of democracy in the country. In 2002,
the response most commonly given was that Mali was a democracy with minor problems,
followed closely by the belief that Mali was a full democracy. In 2005, full democracy was the
most common response, followed by democracy with major problems. Results in 2008 reflected
again that full democracy was the most frequent answer, with democracy with major problems
being a close second.
A significant indicator of this survey question is the overall number of Malians who
perceive Mali to be some form of democracy. When looking at the combined responses of
democracy with major problems, democracy with minor problems, and full democracy, the
percentages are very high. In 2002, 87% of those surveyed categorized Mali as a democracy.
This number remained consistent in 2005, and then increased to 89% in 2008. These
percentages are a positive indicator of citizens’ perceptions of the way democracy has taken hold
and developed in Mali.
The percentage of people who describe Mali as a full democracy increased slightly yet
consistently from 2002 to 2008. This shows promise that citizens in Mali are confident that their
system is working effectively to promote democracy. Despite minor irregularities in certain
elections, the sentiment remains that democracy is taking hold in the country. On the contrary,
the percentage of those who stated that Mali was not a democracy increased from 5% in 2002 to
8% in 2005, before going back down to 5% in 2008. This reflects the impact of flawed elections
on citizens’ perceptions of democracy. People, especially those who were skeptical of
democracy’s ability to flourish in Mali, gave up on Mali’s prospects for being a democracy after
the electoral issues, but saw democratic potential again after the elections in 2002 that ran
smoothly.
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Another interesting trend in the data is the varying levels of individuals who described
Mali as a democracy with major or minor problems. The percentage of people who thought Mali
was a democracy but had major issues to address increased from 24% in 2002, to 29% in both
2005 and 2008. The percentage of people who perceived Mali as a democracy with minor
problems had the opposite progression. 33% of people surveyed considered Mali a democracy
with minor problems in 2002, then 26% in 2005 and 27% in 2008. This can be explained by
citizens’ sentiments after the highly disputed 1997 elections. People could have felt that the
issues of corruption and limited opposition participation were major hindrances to the
democratization process. The survey responses show the change in sentiment that the problems
occurring are minor and democracy will continue to function with these problems still existing,
to the feeling that the problems holding Mali back from a strong, consolidated democracy are
major and need to be taken care of for the country to move forward with a democratic
government.
Table 5.3 State of Democracy
How would you describe the state of democracy in Mali today?
2004
2005
2008
Not a democracy
5%
8%
5%
Democracy with major
24%
29%
29%
problems
Democracy with minor
33%
26%
27%
problems
Full democracy
30%
32%
33%
Sources: Coulibaly and Diarra 2004, Afrobarometer 2005b, Afrobarometer 2008b
While almost 90% of those surveyed in Mali responded that Mali was a democracy with
or without problems, the percentage of those satisfied with the way democracy works in Mali
were much less resounding. In 2002, when questioned about satisfaction with democracy, the
question was phrased to reflect general satisfaction or dissatisfaction with democracy in Mali.
33% of those surveyed said they were unsatisfied, while 63% said they were satisfied (Coulibaly
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and Diarra 2004, 12). In 2005 and 2008, the survey question was more nuanced to reflect levels
of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. The results from these two years are depicted below in Table
5.4.
In 2005 and 2008, the percentage of those not at all satisfied with democracy in Mali
remained at 20%. Those not very satisfied with the way democracy works decreased from 25%
in 2005 to 19% in 2008. Those fairly satisfied with democracy in the country increased only 1%
between the two years, but those very satisfied increased by 7%. The total amount of
dissatisfaction with Mali’s democracy was 45% of those surveyed in 2005, which is almost equal
to the amount of people who were satisfied—49%. In 2008 there was a slightly wider gap
between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, with 39% of respondents claiming dissatisfaction with
Mali’s democracy and 57% saying they were satisfied. It is interesting that the year with the
highest percentage of people satisfied with democracy in Mali was 2002, whereas the survey
results in the previous tables have reflected that 2002 generally brought a slight downturn in prodemocratic responses. It is more understandable that the levels of satisfaction increased in 2008
from 2005 after two consecutive sets of presidential elections that functioned smoothly and
showed improvements in the way that the electoral process was operating.
Table 5.4 Satisfaction with Democracy
How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Mali?
2005
2008
Not at all satisfied
20%
20%
Not very satisfied
25%
19%
Fairly satisfied
28%
29%
Very satisfied
21%
28%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005b, Afrobarometer 2008b
Elections are clearly an important element of a functioning democracy. The majority of
citizens in Mali agree that elections are the best way to select leaders. In a 2002 survey,
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participants were asked whether they were for or against elections as the preferred mode of
establishment of power. 81% said for, and 15% said against. Only 2% of those surveyed were
neither for nor against elections as the means of selecting leaders in Mali (Coulibaly and Diarra
2004, 4). As Table 5.5 shows, 86% of participants in 2005 agreed that elections are the best way
to choose leaders, while only 13% disagreed with this sentiment. In 2008, 81% of citizens
surveyed agreed that elections are the best means of selecting leaders, a slightly lower result than
in 2005. 17% thought Mali should employ a different method of selecting its leaders, an increase
from 2005. This increase could be because of the limited presence of opposition parties in the
2007 elections that would be reflected in the 2008 survey data. Because ATT was practically
unchallenged and was elected in the first round vote, citizens may have felt frustrated with the
electoral system and their lack of viable options of candidates for whom to vote. Regardless of
the slight variation in results, the clear majority of people surveyed consistently responded that
the best method of selecting leaders is through regular, free, and fair elections.
Table 5.5 Electing Leaders
Statement A: We should choose our leaders through regular, free, and fair elections.
Statement B: Because elections can produce bad results, we should adopt another method of
choosing leaders.
2005
2008
Strongly agree with A
41%
50%
Agree with A
45%
31%
Strongly agree with B
8%
9%
Agree with B
5%
8%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005b, Afrobarometer 2008b
An important way of bolstering citizens’ trust in the electoral system is implementing
mechanisms that ensure legitimacy in the electoral process. The National Independent Electoral
Commission (CENI) is the main body in Mali that oversees the way the elections take place.
They have a large force of domestic monitors, who observe the voting process at each polling
station throughout the country. International election monitors including those from the Carter
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Center have commented on the contributions of CENI to the monitoring process in their reports.
When surveyed about trust in CENI in 2002, 46% responded that they trusted CENI, while 32%
said they did not, and 22% were unsure (Coulibaly and Diarra 2004, 18). Table 5.6 shows the
responses to the more refined question asked in the 2005 and 2008 Afrobarometer surveys.
When asked how much they trust CENI in 2005, 33% said a lot, 20% said somewhat, and 17%
did not know. Only a combined 29% trusted CENI only a little or not at all. In 2008, the
percentage of those who trusted CENI a lot decreased to 25%, those who somewhat trusted the
organization increased to 28%, and those who didn’t know decreased by 8%. A total of 38% of
survey respondents trusted CENI only a little or not at all. A positive indicator of this survey is
that the percentage of people who were unsure or did not know if they trusted CENI decreased
across the three years in which the survey was given. The decrease in high levels of trust in
CENI could be from the persistent irregularities that occurred throughout Mali’s presidential
elections from 1992-2007. Electoral materials were missing or arrived late, the polling stations
were tardy in their opening, and results were at times contested. While all of these problems do
not stem from CENI, it is reasonable to assume that the public blamed one or all three of the
agencies responsible for running the electoral process in Mali.
Table 5.6 Institutional Trust
How much do you trust the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI)?
2005
2008
Not at all
13%
15%
Only a little
16%
23%
Somewhat
20%
28%
A lot
33%
25%
Don’t know
17%
9%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005b, Afrobarometer 2008b
The best measure of citizens’ confidence in the electoral process comes from gauging
their perceptions of the freeness and fairness of the last presidential elections in the country. In a
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2001 survey, 24% of respondents claimed that the last presidential elections had been either “not
free and fair” or were “free and fair with major problems.” 55% of those surveyed claimed that
the elections had been “free and fair with minor problems” or “completely free and fair”
(Afrobarometer 2009, 10). Table 5.7 shows the perceived levels of freeness and fairness in the
2002 and 2007 presidential elections. 47% of those surveyed felt that the 2002 election had been
completely free and fair, while only 12% felt that it had not been free and fair. 32% fell in the
middle of these responses, stating that the elections had either been free and fair with minor
problems, or free and fair with major problems. The total percentage of people who described
the 2002 elections as free and fair on some level was 79%. This total percentage increased to
83% in 2008, when reflecting upon the freeness and fairness of the 2007 elections. This shift is
interesting because of the limited involvement of opposition parties in the 2007 elections. It is
possible that despite this factor, citizens still evaluated the actual electoral process as running
smoothly and reflecting their votes, or monitors’ presence reassured voters.
Table 5.7 Freeness and Fairness
How would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?
2005
2008
Not free and fair
12%
10%
Free and fair with major problems
15%
15%
Free and fair with minor problems
17%
20%
Completely free and fair
47%
48%
Sources: Afrobarometer 2005b, Afrobarometer 2008b
Conclusions
As in Chapter 4, the case of Benin, it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions about
the effects international election monitors have exclusively had in changing Malians’ levels of
confidence in Mali’s electoral system. However, based on the history of the elections, the
information available about monitors’ involvement, and the survey data that reflects citizens’
general attitudes towards elections and democracy in Mali, I am able to draw some assumptions
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to assess the validity of my hypothesis. The majority of the survey data shows a decrease in
preference for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, trust in institutions, and confidence in
elections after the 1997 presidential elections that were the most contentious of those in the
1992-2011 time frame I examine in this study. After the 2002 elections, the pro-democracy
indicators rose again, and continued to rise in most cases after the 2007 elections, despite the
minor issues with that election. It is clear that the electoral process plays a crucial role in
determining Malians’ confidence levels in democracy in their country more generally. It is also
highly likely that election monitors have been involved with bolstering these confidence levels.
Monitors were not very involved in the 1992 presidential elections, so citizens were unlikely
trust international election monitors in that year and going into the next presidential elections.
International observers were most critical in their reports in 1997. Monitors declared the 1997
election transparent and free overall, but they also pointed out many problems with the electoral
process. Many citizens agreed with these findings, and may have had more knowledge and trust
in international election monitors in the 2002 presidential elections. This was the year when
monitors were most complimentary in their evaluation of the election, and Malians again
reflected similar sentiments in their assessments of the electoral process in 2002 survey data.
Despite some irregularities and lack of strong participation from opposition parties in 2007,
citizens were still generally satisfied with the electoral process and other pro-democracy
indicators that year. This can be explained by the continued strong presence of international
election monitors in 2007 giving a sense of legitimacy to the electoral process.
When asked in 2005 how likely it is that Mali will remain a democracy, 12% said not at
all likely, 22% said not very likely, 44% said likely and only 14% said very likely
(Afrobarometer 2005b, 23). This is a total of 58% of survey participants who think democracy is
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likely to continue in Mali. While this percentage is not extremely high, it is possible that the
continued presence of international election monitors as a legitimizing force behind elections
will encourage citizens to have more confidence in Mali’s prospects of remaining a democracy.
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CHAPTER SIX: INTERNATIONAL ELECTION MONITORS IN
GUINEA’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Historical Background
Guinea was the first sub-Saharan African country to become independent from French
colonization. On October 2, 1958, Guineans voted for popular sovereignty and became an
independent state under President Ahmed Sekou Toure (Bertelsmann Siftung 2007, 4). Toure
aimed to completely free the Guinean people from their French colonial history. He publicly
voiced his belief that “decolonization does not consist merely in liberating oneself from the
presence of the colonizers: it must necessarily be completed by total liberation from the spirit of
the colonized… from the evil consequences—moral, intellectual and cultural—of the colonial
system” (Jallow 2011, 375). Despite Toure’s desire to free the Guinean people from the “evil”
of colonization, he imposed his own destructive policies on citizens that ended up being the
defining legacy of his presidency.
Toure subjected Guinea to an extended period of turbulence and brutality as the country’s
head of state. He ruled for a quarter of a century, holding onto power as tightly as he could.
Toure’s style of governance was radical, which was apparent even before his presidency when he
was active within the Parti Democratique du Guinee (PDG), which he influenced to become
fairly militant in its operations. Toure appreciated Maxist-Leninist views of society, and he used
a single-party system to proliferate these views (Harshe 1984, 624). “Those who desired to
speak politics in Guinea had to speak politics according to Sekou Toure” (Jallow 2011, 377).
The only party allowed to exist was his own PDG (Harshe 1984, 624).
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Presidential elections in Guinea under the single party system operated under specific
conditions. Only one candidate was nominated for the presidency—Toure. Elections were held
more as a symbol than as a way for citizens to select the leader they wanted in office. Voter
turnout levels were often low, as voters knew they only had one option to select on the
presidential ballot. The party in power continuously struggled to increase voter participation
rates to show a unanimous decision by the Guinean people in the selection of the president.
Although Toure was elected automatically, a certain number of votes were necessary to adhere to
party principles and ensure the legitimacy of the election results in the eyes of the citizens and
the international community (Diallo 2009, 209). Because of the single party system, Toure was
able to ensure that he could retain his position as president.
Toure was also able to maintain power for such a long period because of his approach of
dealing with competition. He was suspicious of the Guinean military, and kept a close watch
over the military leaders’ actions. He also tried to be involved with the public enough that they
would not turn against them. If Toure ever felt challenged, he wasted no time in resorting to
violent means of addressing the issue (Harshe 1984, 624-625). For example, in 1970, Toure had
58 people publicly hanged for an alleged conspiracy plot to assassinate him (Jallow 2011, 378).
Actions such as this prompted the common designation of Toure as “perhaps the most vehement
exponent of the single-party system in Africa” (Jallow 2011, 375) and “one of the most ruthless
dictators of modern Africa” (Jallow 2011, 378).
More impressively, Toure’s foreign policy initiatives helped to elevate Guinea’s position
in African society and give it some legitimacy in the international arena. Toure strongly opposed
colonization and racism. His efforts to address these issues included using the media to build a
force of opposition to Portuguese rule in Guinea-Bissau and racism in South Africa (Harshe
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1984, 625). He was bold in both his support and his disapproval of policies. Toure died during
heart surgery following sudden heart complications on March 26, 1984 (Jallow 2011, 379).
After Toure’s unexpected death, Guinea fell into disarray. Prime Minister Lansana
Béavogui was appointed to be the interim president, but the power structure was unclear. A
military group under the control of Colonel Diarra Traore and Colonel Lansana Conté declared
itself the Military Committee for National Redress (CMRN) and overthrew the interim
government on April 2, 1984. Conté declared himself the President, and Traore was designated
as Prime Minister (Jallow 2011, 379).
The new government’s first initiatives included invalidating the Constitution left over
from the Toure government. Within the first eight months of his presidency, Conté reduced
Traore’s rank from Prime Minister to education minister, showing his hunger for complete
control. Within another eight-month period, in July 1985, there was a coup attempt in which the
military had to get involved to put an end to the fighting (Jallow 2011, 379).
Under Conté’s presidency, the government passed a new constitution in December 1990
that allowed for a multi-party political system and acknowledged human, civil, and political
rights (Diallo 2009; Jallow 2011, 380). 99% of voters approved the new constitution that
displayed clear intentions to decentralize, liberalize, and restructure the government (Diallo
2009; International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1998). A multi-party structure was
highlighted, as well as an electoral system formed around “universal direct and secret suffrage”
(Diallo 2009, 211). While Guinea produced a new constitution under Conté, he “never intended
to create a genuine democracy—that is, to allow for a change of power. Manipulated elections,
oppression and intimidation poisoned the political climate” (Bertelsmann Siftung 2007, 4).
Conté ruled in Guinea for twenty-four years until his own death (Jallow 2011, 371). At the end
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of President Conté’s life, he had both diabetes and leukemia, and is suspected of having amnesia
as well. Conté was therefore unable to be an effective leader, but he held onto power until his
death on December 22, 2008, when Moussa Dadis Camara led a military coup and declared
himself President (Bertelsmann Siftung 2007, 2; Bertelsmann Siftung 2009, 2). Guinea was in
worse condition after Conté’s death than it had been in 1958 when it became independent or in
1984 after Toure’s death (Jallow 2011, 371-372).

Independent Variable: Formal Adherence to the Norm of International Election Monitoring

As in the two previous chapters, I operationalize the independent variable of the study,
the spread of the norm of international election monitoring, by noting Guinea’s compliance with
the norm of international election monitoring through its invitation of international monitors to
its presidential elections. My hypothesis suggests that the presence of international election
monitors during presidential elections in Guinea produces an increase in citizens’ levels of trust
in Guinean elections. Should the available data support this hypothesis, the acknowledgement of
the significant role of international election monitors in Guinean elections would be monumental
in moving Guinea towards a consolidated democracy.
Guinea’s history has been marked by single-party regimes that left a lasting legacy of
resistance to diversity in the political arena. Dissent and opposition to the majority party were
prohibited for many years, and have just recently begun to become more apparent in Guinean
politics. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine the history of presidential elections in
Guinea from 1990 to 2011 to explore the role international election monitors have played in
changing citizens’ perspectives on electoral efficacy and their levels of confidence in the
electoral process.
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Elections in Guinea
Guinea’s electoral history dates back to 1946, when the government held legislative
elections to elect an African representative to the National Assembly in Guinea (Diallo 2009,
208). Since that point in time, “Democratic experiments and electoral politics have failed in
Guinea, and more generally in Africa not because they are unsuitable to African conditions as
argued by some scholars, but because of African leaders’ propensity to suppress dissent and
cling indefinitely on to power and their failure to politically empower their peoples” (Jallow
2011, 371). As evidenced by the length of the presidencies of Toure and Conté, and as will be
further illustrated in this chapter, leaders in Guinea have repeatedly attempted to extend their rule
past the number of terms a president can and should hold according to democratic principles.
Today, Guinea is a republic. The president is elected by popular vote to hold up to two
five-year terms. There is universal suffrage for those aged 18 and older. The elections are
structured so that if a candidate wins the majority of the votes they are elected; if not there is a
runoff election. There are over 130 political parties registered (Central Intelligence Agency
2013c). It is clear that much progress has been made towards democracy since the Toure and
Conté eras in Guinea’s history. Each set of elections throughout the past decade has brought a
new dynamic to the country and has influenced citizens’ perceptions of democracy.
“Considering the political history of Guinea, analyzing these elections from 1990 to this date
could help us take stock of the electoral processes and progress that the country has made in
complying with democratic rules” (Diallo 2009, 212). In the following sections, I evaluate the
events and implications of the recent presidential elections in Guinea and the role that
international election monitors played in these elections.
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The 1993 Elections
The first post-independence multiparty presidential election in Guinea was held on
December 19, 1993. Eight candidates competed for the presidency. While this election was a
major step forward in Guinea’s democratization process, it was filled with serious flaws (Diallo
2009, 212-213). Delays in the arrival of election materials and other signs of incomplete
preparation for the elections left voters with a sense of suspicion about the process. This
increased the rumors of electoral fraud, accelerating the spiral of social and political tensions
(International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1993, 50). Additionally, opposition party
leaders faced major obstacles in their attempts to campaign. In Conté’s home region, no other
candidates were permitted to campaign. Members of the government were recognized as
favoring certain candidates over others, and gave these candidates special privileges, or withheld
opposition party leaders’ ability to campaign in certain districts or public facilities. State
resources were heavily allocated in the direction of the majority party, giving the party in power
an advantage over the opposition candidates. Officials even confiscated the voting cards of
citizens’ they presumed would vote for an opposition party candidate (Diallo 2009, 212-213).
In 1993, there were 2,859,403 registered voters and 2,236,426 of these individuals
actually voted, meaning 78% of those registered cast a vote (International Foundation for
Electoral Systems 1998, 9). The Supreme Court verified the results of the elections on January 4,
1994, concluding that Lansana Conté had won the election in the first round with 51.7% of the
votes (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1993, 1).
Despite the Supreme Court ruling, international election observers proclaimed that the
1993 elections were not free, fair, or transparent. The government was not accepting of
democratic elections and refused to cooperate with opposition parties or members of civil society
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(Organisation internationale de la Francophonie 1998). Nineteen political parties contested the
election results and claimed that the elections were replete with voter intimidation and other
methods of fraud and corruption (Jallow 2011, 380). The International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES) declared that the results of the 1993 elections were fraudulent and did not reflect
the real electoral results or the desires of the Guinean people (International Foundation for
Electoral Systems 1993, 3).
Guineans actively demonstrated their disapproval of Conté. On September 24, 1994,
close to 30,000 Guineans rallied for a transitional government because of their opposition to the
Conté administration’s governance. Four main opposition parties in Guinea joined together in
1995 to form the Coordination Democratique (Codem), which had the primary goal of removing
Conté from his position. After a particularly hostile riot in 1996, Conté supposedly went into
hiding to protect himself from his own constituents (Jallow 2011, 380).
In a joint seminar by IFES and UNDP on November 24, 1993, local and international
press was able to learn about the upcoming elections and ask some questions. While these
covered a broad range of topics, two of those highlighted in the IFES report included a question
about the number and origin of the international election monitors who would be present at the
election, and the qualifications of national election observers. Guinea decided not to permit
domestic observers to be a part of the 1993 elections because of expected problems with their
neutrality (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1993, 26).
The Guinean government did not communicate well with the international observers
present during the election. The observer delegations did not receive any information or access
into the process until 24 hours before the election. The government did not specify the roles
different observers should play or acknowledge any differences between the monitors present
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from different NGOs or other organizations. The IFES election report states that the
government’s behavior and attitude towards the efforts of international election monitors shows
that the Guinean government neither understands nor is concerned about international election
monitoring (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1993, 55). One of the nine
recommendations that IFES made to the Guinean government was that it needed to be more open
to election monitoring, by both international and domestic monitors (International Foundation for
Electoral Systems 1993, 93).

The 1998 Elections
The second presidential election was held on December 14, 1998 (Diallo 2009, 214).
Many countries invested in Guinea’s electoral process in 1998 by supplying materials or
assistance of some kind to help with the democratization process. Canada, the United States,
Egypt, Germany, the European Union, China, France, and Libya, as well as some NGOs all
contributed to the elections in some fashion (International Foundation for Electoral Systems
1998, 12-13).
3,796,293 people were registered to vote in the 1998 elections, an increase from 1993.
69.82% of voters turned out at the elections (International Foundation for Electoral Systems
1998, 28). There were 8 candidates running in the election, and Conte won 50.98% of the votes,
as well as the presidency for five more years (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
1998). Again there was discrimination against voters who were suspected of supporting
opposition candidates (Diallo 2009, 214). The U.S. State Department declared that violence
surrounded the electoral process and irregularities were rampant. No independent electoral body
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ran the elections, which was a major cause for dissent among the population and opposition
parties (Jallow 2011, 381).
Many international organizations worked together to observe the elections. Delegates
represented organizations such as la Francophonie, NDI, the Organization of African Unity,
ECOWAS, Observatoire International des Libertés et des Médias, Pan-African Permanent
Conference on Democracy and the Mastery of Transition in Africa, and countries including Côte
d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mauritania, Senegal, and Togo. Most of the organizations were not planning on
sending observers to the elections, but when UN Observers decided not to observe the elections,
other organizations agreed to send observer missions (International Foundation for Electoral
Systems 1998, 29-30).
Despite the population and opposition parties’ problems with the election outcomes, the
international election monitors generally found the electoral process to be free and fair. The
monitors from la Francophonie declared elections to be fair, although they did make note of
irregularities in the electoral process (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie 1998). The
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) sent two experts to observe and facilitate
the elections. The IFES report discussed some violence and irregularities in the 1998 elections,
but indicated that overall the elections were free and fair (International Foundation for Electoral
Systems 1998). NDI also confirmed that the electoral process operated smoothly and that each
political party involved in the elections had a representative present at the polling stations, “an
essential element for trust in the process and acceptance of the results” (International Foundation
for Electoral Systems 1998, 31).
After securing his second term in the multiparty system, Conté began to look towards the
future. He announced a plan to extend the presidential term from five to seven years. Conté also
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wanted to abolish the limit on the number of terms a president is eligible to hold, meaning he
could hold power for as many terms as he was re-elected. All of these adjustments seemed to be
Conté’s approach to ensure he could stay in power indefinitely. The government passed a
referendum in November 2001 that allowed Conté to hold an unlimited number of 7-year terms
as president (Jallow 2011, 371). Government data states that 98% of Guineans approved of these
agendas (Jallow 2011, 382), but the behavior of Guineans after the 2003 elections reflected
otherwise.

The 2003 Elections
December 21, 2003 was Guinea’s third multiparty presidential election since
independence. At this point, “the Guinean population, now disillusioned, had lost faith in the
elections” (Diallo 2009, 214). All of the biggest opposition parties boycotted the elections
because of the issues they had with Conté and his party’s monopoly on governmental power.
Conté ran against just one other candidate and won the election by securing over 95% of the
votes (Diallo 2009, 214-215; Jallow 2011, 371; Jallow 2011, 382).
One of the problems in the election was the “lack of credible election monitoring and
management bodies” (Diallo 2009, 219). Other problems included officials’ lack of neutrality,
misallocation of government resources, and election fraud and manipulation. Guinea denied
local NGOs the ability to observe the elections but did invite international election monitors to
observe in order to ensure that the elections were perceived as legitimate and to reduce the
chances that countries might refuse Guinea aid or enforce other sanctions if international
monitors were not present (Diallo 2009, 224).
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Between 2003 and 2006 there were a series of meetings designed to serve as a forum for
discussing Guinea’s national issues and ways to address them. A few of these meetings focused
specifically on elections and democratization in Guinea. The Gorée Meeting was held in
Senegal in mid-June 2005. The goal of the meeting was to create a better environment for free
and fair elections. The National Forum of Civil Society on the electoral process in Guinea in
March 2006 focused on civil society’s role in the past and future democratization process in
Guinea (Diallo 2009, 204-206).
In June 2004 there were violent protests throughout Guinea, especially in the capital city
of Conakry. When this round of demonstrations ended, another started again in September then
again in December. Protests, strikes and uprisings continued throughout 2006 and into 2007. In
February 2007, Conté declared that Guinea was in a state of emergency (Jallow 2011, 383).
Public discontent continued as Conté became older and weaker. Despite illness, Conté
continued to declare his ability to govern the country. After Conté’s death in December 2008,
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara led a military coup and appointed himself president and head of
the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), that was newly in charge of
transitioning Guinea to a stable government. Camara was not a figure who the public
recognized, but citizens in Guinea were excited about the prospects for democracy that Camara
promised them (Jallow 2011, 372; Time 2009). “The coup was reported to have had the backing
of most Guineans” (Jallow 2011, 373). However, it became clear that Camara would not lead
Guinea to hold elections within a year of his coming into power. The public became less and
less convinced that Guinea really was moving towards democracy. Oury Bah, the head of Union
of Democratic Forces (UFDG), an opposition party, claimed that under Camara, “There’s no
reason to be optimistic” (Time 2009).
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The public organized mass demonstrations to express their frustration with the
government’s false promises of democracy. On September 28, 2009, tens of thousands of
members of Guinea’s major opposition movement called Forces Vives gathered in Conakry’s
national soccer stadium to protest the authoritarian style leadership the government seemed to be
embodying. Witnesses state that armed forces reacted to the protest by locking the
prodemocracy supporters inside the stadium and starting to shoot. Many of the wounded were
finished off with bayonets (Time 2009). Over 100 women and girls were publically gang raped.
At least 157 people rallying for democracy died in the massacre and another 1,200 were injured.
The bodies were disposed of in a mass grave (U.S. Department of State 2012, 2-3; Jallow 2011,
373; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012, 2).
After the massacre of 2009, President Camara’s bodyguard, who had been selected to
take the blame for the horrific incident, shot Camara in the head. Konaté, the Defense Minister
at the time of Camara’s death, came to power. Konaté decided that Guinea would hold
presidential elections to select its next president (Bertelsmann Siftung 2012, 2). “Guineans
[were] faced with the paradoxical situation of hoping that the military—which ha[d]
systematically killed, raped, arbitrarily arrested and detained its own citizens—w[ould] now be
the institution to reinstate civil rights” (Bertelsmann Siftung 2009, 7).

The 2010 Elections
Guinea began taking steps in the right direction in 2010 that helped to ease the outrage
and despair surrounding the 2008 massacre. The Ouagadougou Agreement was signed in
January 2010, which highlighted elections as a key component of political accountability. This
Agreement was crucial in allowing Guineans to regain confidence and hope in their political
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system (The Carter Center 2010a). Citizens felt as though a new political era was about to
begin—an era that would start with the 2010 presidential elections.
Guinea held its fourth multiparty presidential elections in June and November 2010.
Leading up to the elections, there were conflicts between members of the majority and
opposition parties that led to violence and even deaths of those involved (Human Rights Watch
2011). Despite some pre-election violence, the 2010 elections were the first free and fair
elections in Guinea since its independence. Election monitors described the “palpable sense of
excitement and expectation among Guineans, who hope for a meaningful democratic transition
and civilian government” (The Carter Center 2010a). The monitors also expressed their desire to
“contribute to a peaceful, transparent, and credible electoral process and […] support Guinea’s
efforts to promote key reforms for future elections” (The Carter Center 2010b).
The first round of voting took place on June 27, 2010. Since there was no incumbent
running for re-election, all 24 candidates started on the same footing. 4.2 million out of Guinea’s
10 million citizens registered to vote (The Carter Center 2010e). Cellou Diallo and Alpha Condé
were announced to be the two leading candidates after the first round of elections. The elections
were not flawless—there were minor problems resulting from managerial issues—but overall the
high voter turnout and sense of national unity surrounding the elections overpowered the
procedural issues (The Carter Center 2010c).
The second round of the 2010 elections was initially scheduled for September but was
rescheduled multiple times because the electoral management body was not prepared. The
election was finally held on November 7, 2010. There was violence both before and after the
November election, including rallies in September that left 50 people injured (U.S. Department
of State 2012, 16; The Carter Center 2010e). Before the results of the run-off election were
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released, Diallo announced that he would not endorse the outcome because some of his
supporters had not been permitted to vote. Diallo had received more votes than Condé in the
first round and had expected to win the second round easily, so when the electoral commission,
CENI, announced results that put Condé in the lead with 52.5% of the votes, Diallo’s supporters
protested. The rallies led to arrests, injuries and even some deaths. President Konaté declared a
state of emergency with a strict curfew to stop the violence (The Carter Center 2010e). Diallo
formally objected the results and brought them before the Supreme Court. In December, the
Supreme Court confirmed the election outcome. Alpha Condé was sworn in December 21, 2010
(Bertelsmann Siftung 2012).
The 2010 elections were first elections in Guinea since independence to be perceived by
citizens, observers, and the international community as free, fair, and transparent (Human Rights
Watch 2011). International observers had a strong presence at the elections. The international
election monitors included representatives from France, the United States, the European Union,
ECOWAS, IFES, NDI, The Carter Center and the African Union. The EU had about 70
monitors present, and ECOWAS had 200. The Carter Center sent eight long-term monitors to
the election in addition to over 20 short-term observers (The Carter Center 2010a). Despite
accounts of election fraud of various types, the international observers officially declared the
elections to be generally free and fair (Human Rights Watch 2011; U.S. State Department 2012,
16; Bertelsmann Siftung 2012). The Carter Center noted that “the successful voting process
[was] an overwhelming testament of Guineans’ profound desire to express their will at the ballot
box and to complete their historic democratic transition” (The Carter Center 2010d). Despite the
violence surrounding the elections, CENI made important steps towards improving the electoral
process, and the Guinean citizens showed their enthusiasm to participate in a democratic system.
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Dependent Variable: Levels of Citizens’ Confidence in the Electoral Process
I assess Guinean citizens’ confidence in the electoral process as indicated by their support
for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, trust in political institutions, and judgment of past
presidential elections. It is impossible to draw definitive conclusions about these factors because
of the lack of available data, in contrast to the other two case studies. One difficulty with this
case resulted from the lack of survey data, which can provide valuable insights into public
opinion. Therefore, I used secondary sources to draw conclusions about citizens’ confidence in
the efficacy and transparency of the electoral process in Guinea. The 2012 Bertelsmann Siftung
Transformation Index Country Report for Guinea states,
There is no survey data available on public opinion regarding democracy in Guinea, but
Guinean citizens have shown themselves ready to organize, demonstrate, and to even die
for securing the right to choose those who represent them and to send home those who do
a poor job. After 52 years of autocratic rule, no term limits, and little separation of
powers, this is a mostly unprecedented experiment in Guinea, and may be accompanied
both by great enthusiasm and by unrealistic expectations. Like many other West Africans,
Guineans retain some skepticism about democracy, and are keenly aware that a credible
presidential election is one small step toward the broader set of institutions and practices
that constitute democracy. (Bertelsmann Siftung 2012, 9)
Guineans’ frustration with election results and the failure of democracy in the past has undercut
their support for democracy in Guinea (Bertelsmann Siftung 2009). Low participation levels in
Guinean elections show the citizens’ disenchantment with democratization through elections
based on their country’s flawed electoral record. Diallo (2009) relates the basic thought process
of many Guineans who refuse to go to the polls on Election Day. “As long as this regime is
organizing the elections, the results are known beforehand. So we might as well make do and
refuse to give moral support to fraud” (Diallo 2009, 230). When people feel like their vote does
not matter, they have little to no motivation to participate in the electoral process.
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Because of their tumultuous history with elections and authoritarian rule, Guineans have
had a particularly difficult time committing to democratic values. “Although Guineans state
their strong commitment to the idea of democracy, in reality, many remain highly skeptical of
Western-style democracy” (Bertelsmann Siftung 2009, 8). There are several reasons this seems
to be the case. First, Guineans preferred military rule to the constitutional alternative that a
member of the old government took over after President Conté’s death. Next, Guineans are
intent to limit the number of political parties in the country to two or three. It also appears that
some Guineans fear that elections will bring dissidence among different ethnic groups or
political parties (Bertelsmann Siftung 2012, 17). Citizens seem to want to have a restricted
democracy in order to evade issues stemming from too much political competition (Bertelsmann
Siftung 2009, 8). Potential actors against democracy in Guinea include the military and ethnic
groups, particularly the Fulbe and Kpelle (Bertelsmann Siftung 2012, 18).
Another issue with measuring citizens’ support for democracy stems from the fact that it
was difficult to gauge Guinean’s interest in democracy before 2010, because they had no
experience with that type of government (Bertelsmann Siftung 2007). The 2010 elections were
the first time that democracy was promised and steps were taken after the elections to ensure that
democratic practices were established and maintained. Alassane Sylla, a worker at a Guinean
electric company said on Election Day in 2010, “We’ve been waiting for 52 years. Today I’ve
waited three hours, but I don’t mind” (Time 2010). Citizens had long anticipated the opportunity
to vote in free and fair elections—elections in which their vote would actually be counted and
contribute to the selection of the next Guinean president.
This anticipation and excitement for transparency and credibility in elections is only one
indicator that suggests that citizens desire stronger democracy in the country. A factor signaling
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progress towards democracy “is the fact that Guineans have grown far more outspoken in
demanding the effective democratic protections to which they are entitled by law” (Bertelsmann
Siftung 2012, 8). There seems to be consensus on many values that democracy supports,
including the importance of term limits and a balance of power.
It is clear that citizens’ confidence levels and degree of trust in the electoral process in
Guinea have just begun to change after the 2010 presidential elections. Before 2010, Guineans
were subject to authoritarian rule that meant they were limited in certain aspects of their
freedoms, including the ability to vote in multiparty elections. Citizens did not trust the
president or the outcome of elections. The population felt as though the government made
promises they did not intend to keep. By the time Camara was president, the public was fed up
with authoritarian regimes and made clear that democracy was their preferred type of
government.

Conclusions
The lack of available data about public opinion in Guinea precludes a clear-cut
conclusion regarding my hypothesis. It is clear that Guinea has taken significant steps towards a
consolidated democracy:
Guineans must now continue down this path so that this opportunity to have real
democracy for the first time in the country’s history is not lost. The way to ensure that
democracy flourishes is not only by casting ballots in a peaceful manner on Election Day
and then allowing the legal process to take its course. Guineans must also continue to be
engaged in their country’s affairs by voicing their concerns to the government and
holding its elected officials accountable. Democracy is not just the act of electing
leaders—citizens have to do their part to ensure the process remains on track.
(International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2010b)
The role of international election monitors in that progress towards democracy is less clear in the
case of Guinea than in the other two cases in this study.
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By using the information published about the presidential elections, I was able to learn
about the role that international election monitors played in Guinea’s past elections. While
monitors were present at each of the four elections examined in this case study, they played a
larger role in the 1998 and 2010 elections than in 1993 or 2003. However, even when monitors
had a strong presence, citizens often still came away with feelings of distrust because of the long
history of Guinean leaders breaking their promises to their constituents. Jallow (2011) poses
insightful questions about the relationship between civil society and the government: “Is it really
possible to have effective democratic and electoral regimes without transforming the civic
culture—the people’s attitudes, perceptions, and understandings of the nation-state system? Is
there not an anomaly between African peoples’ ideas and understandings of government and the
realities of the modern nation state under which they live and act?” (386).
To improve the prospects of a thriving democracy in Guinea, it is imperative that the
government aims to rebuild the trust between themselves and the population. The newly elected
government has much more international and domestic credibility than did many of Guinea’s
past leaders (Bertelsmann Siftung 2012). This will be crucial in ensuring that the next elections
run even more smoothly than did the 2010 presidential elections.
Holding regular, free and fair elections is another prerequisite for successful democracy.
In order for Guinea to move towards freer and fairer elections, it is necessary for Guinean
citizens to put pressure on the government to encourage the government to be accountable to its
own promises (Bertelsmann Siftung 2009, 21). International pressure will also play a key role in
ensuring the government holds regular, transparent, and credible elections. While international
election monitors have played a role in Guinea’s democratization, they need to continue their
presence during elections as democratic practices grow stronger in Guinea in order for more
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conclusive results to be drawn. Public opinion survey data would be incredibly helpful in
evaluating the role played by the international monitors in changing the public’s confidence
levels in the Guinean electoral system, and even just in evaluating the expectations and
sentiments of Guineans regarding democracy in their country.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The norm of international election monitoring took hold around the globe in the early
1990s. Its rise and spread reflected changing expectations of democratic principles, human
rights, and expectations of state sovereignty. After the fall of the Soviet Union, democracy
quickly became the model of government for developed and developing countries. Since
elections are such an important function of democracy, governments are expected to invite
international election monitors to ensure that the elections operate smoothly. Pressure by the
international community as well as domestic pressure from citizens for free and fair elections led
many governments to invite international monitors and observers to their elections starting in the
1990s. “This tremendous increase in the use of election monitoring is a signal that states […]
have come to accept that internal legitimacy is at least partially dependent on external validation
and that external legitimacy depends in part on electoral processes that meet international
standards” (van Sickle and Sandholtz 2009, 298). Authors of the existing literature on
international election monitoring have focused on governments’ desire for external legitimacy as
motivation for inviting monitors. This focus on international opinion neglects to recognize the
significance of citizens’ confidence levels in the government and the institutions it supports.
“Unless the people buy into the electoral process, it is doomed from the outset” (Soudriette 2007,
12). Because of this, it is crucial that emerging democracies’ governments invite international
monitors to their elections to ensure that both international and domestic actors are confident in
the transparency and efficacy of the electoral process.
The literature about elections and democracy in Africa right now are much more from the
top-down than bottom-up perspective (Bratton 2007, 63). This means there is not much
literature focusing on African citizens’ views of democracy, “yet they are precisely the ones who
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matter and who should be consulted first” (Bratton 2007, 63). Additionally, many authors claim
that election monitors “may” inspire confidence in elections and the democratic process (Abbink
and Hesseling 2000; Soudriette and Pilon 2007; López-Pintor 2007). But how accurate is this
claim? The purpose of this study was to analyze the significance of the rise of the norm of
international election monitors and its effects on citizens’ confidence levels in the electoral
process in their countries. Through the examination of the cases of Benin, Mali and Guinea, I
sought to determine whether there is a relationship between the variables in my model. The
independent variable was formal government adherence to the norm of international election
monitoring and the dependent variable was citizens’ confidence levels in the domestic electoral
process. I hypothesized that government adherence to the norm of international election
monitoring would promote higher citizen confidence levels in the efficacy and transparency of
the electoral process. While my results are not definitive, I find evidence that supports my
hypothesis in each of the three cases, particularly in Benin and Mali. I discuss my analysis and
conclusions in the following sections.

Analysis of Findings
The cases of Benin, Mali and Guinea provide different insights into the role of
international election monitors in presidential elections and the influence the monitors have over
the citizens in these countries. While the three francophone West African countries had the same
history of French colonization and independence between 1958 and 1960, their progress towards
democratic consolidation has taken disparate paths. In 2011, the end of the time frame examined
in this study, Beninese, Malian and Guinean citizens expressed their desire for democracy
despite the flaws that may have accompanied democracy’s arrival in their respective countries.
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“Democracy is the stated aim of most African countries but practice varies enormously and many
countries are not on a one-way street toward political liberalization” (Herbst 2011, 394). Benin
and Mali have had much more straightforward paths than Guinea to the level of democracy at
which they were functioning in 2011. While all of the countries have experienced periods of
authoritarian-style leadership in their recent histories (Benin very briefly, Mali slightly longer,
and Guinea for the majority of its existence since independence), their governments have all
adopted factors crucial to democratic consolidation. These practices include holding regular
elections and inviting international election monitors to ensure that the elections are free and fair.
Benin, Mali and Guinea have the same basic procedures for running their presidential
elections. In the first round of elections, a candidate must win the majority of the votes to be
elected. If no candidate wins over 50% of the votes, a run-off election is held between the two
candidates who garnered the most votes in the first round. Despite the similarity in their
systems, the results of presidential elections in Benin, Mali and Guinea have been very different,
and the public and international community’s responses to these results have also varied widely
between the countries.

The Case of Benin
Benin has sound institutional support to help elections run smoothly. The Autonomous
National Electoral Commission (CENA) organizes and operates the elections, and announces
their tallies of the votes. The Constitutional Court is the body that releases the official results of
the elections and regulates any problems that occur during or after the electoral process
(L’organisation internationale de la Francophonie 2001). Benin’s government invited
international election monitors to its 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011 presidential elections.
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1991 brought about a transfer of power from Mathieu Kérékou to Nicéphore Soglo. The 1996
elections shifted presidential power back to Kérékou. The number of election monitoring groups
present during the 1996 elections was much higher than the number of election observers in
Benin in 1991. The observers confirmed the validity of the results and the transparency of the
process. The 2001 elections proved more problematic, as the main opposition candidates
boycotted the run-off election. Many Beninese accused Kérékou of electoral fraud. The fourth
place candidate in the first round was the only candidate who agreed to compete in the run-off
election against Kérékou, and Kérékou won this contest easily, with 84% of the votes
(Houngnikpo 2011). The monitors’ reports after these elections were not as complimentary as
they had been in 1996. The 2006 elections had some organizational problems, but ended up
bringing Thomas Boni Yayi into the presidency. He was re-elected in 2011, but observers
expressed some concern about the levels of tension in Benin after the announcement of the
results (Africa Research Bulletin 2011, 18763).
Combining this historical information about Benin’s elections with public opinion survey
data allows for a clearer understanding of the role of international election monitors play in
changing citizens’ confidence levels in the electoral process. Voter turnout in Benin was very
high across the three years accounted for in the survey data, ranging from 88%-91% of those
surveyed. Citizens’ preference for democracy was highest following the 2006 elections, which
named Yayi President. There was an 11% increase in those who expressed their preference for
democracy from the previous survey, reflecting citizens’ active acknowledgement of the benefits
democracy could provide them in terms of economic and social development under Yayi’s
leadership (Afrobarometer 2005a; Afrobarometer 2008a). Citizens’ satisfaction with democracy
in Benin reflected a similar pattern—69% of those surveyed in 2008 claimed to be either fairly or
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very satisfied with the way democracy works in Benin—the results following the 2006 elections
were higher than those following the 2001 or 2011 elections (Afrobarometer 2005a;
Afrobarometer 2008a; Afrobarometer 2011). The percentage of Beninese surveyed who rated
the last presidential election as free and fair in some regard—whether with major problems,
minor problems, or completely free and fair—fluctuated between 90% in 2005 to 96% in 2008
then down to 86% in 2011 (Afrobarometer 2005a; Afrobarometer 2008a; Afrobarometer 2011).
These results likely reflect citizens’ sentiments that the 2001 elections involved the opposition
candidates boycotting the run-off election and contested results, the 2006 elections running very
smoothly after a small delay, as well as that the more serious delays in the 2011 elections were
frustrating and the violence and criticism surrounding the elections was alarming.
Overall, the 2006 elections clearly had a strong impact on citizens’ perceptions of
democracy in Benin. The reports of the UN, la Francophonie, and ECOWAS all declared the
2006 elections free, fair and transparent and there were the fewest reports of irregularities in
these elections. The presence of international election monitors cannot be definitively linked to
the success of democracy in Benin reflected in the 2008 Afrobarometer surveys, or in the past
decade more generally. The monitors’ reports on the elections do, however, match up with
citizens’ public opinion reflected in the survey data. This implies that the monitors’ ability to
assess the situation in Benin surrounding the elections mirrored citizens’ sentiments. It is
possible that the international observers were one of the factors that influenced citizens’
confidence in the elections. The Beninese people’s high levels of trust in democracy and
perceptions of free and fair elections that increase at a fairly steady rate across the selected
survey questions suggest that international election monitors, in addition to other actors such as
CENA and domestic monitors, have been able to bolster support for democracy and trust in the
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electoral process since 1990. These assumptions support my hypothesis by signaling that the
Beninese government’s adherence to the norm of international election monitoring has led to
increased levels of citizen confidence in Benin’s electoral process. However, because the
available data does not allow me to directly measure the effects of international monitors on
citizens’ confidence levels, the possibility remains that there is in fact no positive relationship
between the two variables in my model.

The Case of Mali
Mali’s political history with authoritarian style regimes led to a slower transition to a
functioning democracy than Benin experienced. While Mali has three agencies in place to run
the elections, Malians felt frustration with the democratic system since elections did not seem to
produce any changes to society for fifteen years. Mali has made significant progress in
establishing democratic institutions but is now struggling to incorporate them into society and
gain citizens’ trust in these institutions.
Mali invited international election monitors to all of its multiparty presidential
elections—in 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. The elections in 1992 were Mali’s first multiparty
elections after independence. Alpha Oumar Konaré won the 1992 presidential election. Over 40
election observers were present and declared the elections free and fair. The media did report
that monitors were not extremely involved in the electoral process, so the monitors’ assessments
may not have carried meaningful implications about the elections and state of democracy in Mali
(Lange 2000). The 1997 elections were comprised of delays, confusion, boycotts, and
controversial results. Konaré won reelection in the first round. The monitors from la
Francophonie determined that the elections were lawful and transparent, despite some
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irregularities (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie 1997). The 2002 elections were
much freer and fairer than the 1992 and 1997 elections. Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) was
elected President, and monitors from la Francophonie, the National Democratic Institute, and the
Carter Center found the elections to be free and fair. In 2007, many Malians felt as though their
country was operating under a single party system because of Touré’s leadership style and the
lack of opposition (Camara 2011). ATT was reelected and the elections were again labeled free
and fair.
An examination of Mali’s electoral history in addition to public opinion survey data
provides insight into how international election monitors impact citizens’ confidence levels in
Mali’s electoral process. Voter turnout across all four of Mali’s presidential elections between
1990 and 2011 was low—less than 40%. The percentages grew slowly yet consistently from
1992 to 2007, from 21.61%, to 29.2%., to 29.99%, and finally to 36.24% (Camara 2011, 86).
While Malians were not as readily accepting of democracy or elections as Beninese, they are
slowly warming up to the idea. If the trend continues, voter turnout rates should continue to
increase as Malians grow more accustomed to democratic practices and values in their country.
This is reinforced by Malians support for democratic government. Between 68% and 72% of
those surveyed expressed that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
(Coulibaly and Diarra 2004; Afrobarometer 2005b; Afrobarometer 2008b). This represents a
clear majority of the population. The majority of respondents also viewed Mali as a democracy
at the time of the survey. 87% of those surveyed characterized Mali as a democracy, with or
without flaws, in 2002 and 2005. In 2008 this indicator increased to 89% (Coulibaly and Diarra
2004; Afrobarometer 2005b; Afrobarometer 2008b). Despite the fact that the majority of
individuals surveyed viewed Mali as a democracy, the percentage of those who were satisfied
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with the way democracy works in Mali was much smaller. For example, in 2005, 45% were not
very satisfied or dissatisfied, and 49% were fairly or very satisfied (Afrobarometer 2005b,
Afrobarometer 2008b). When evaluating the freeness and fairness of the elections themselves,
citizens’ evaluations have been improving over time. In 2001, 55% of survey respondents
described the last elections as being “free and fair with minor problems” or “completely free and
fair” (Afrobarometer 2009, 10). In 2005 this percentage increased to 70% and it increased again
to 83% in 2008 (Afrobarometer 2005b; Afrobarometer 2008b). The 13% increase following the
2007 election is interesting because there was not much involvement by opposition parties, so
ATT was largely uncontested in the election. This shows Malians are becoming more
comfortable with elections in their country, despite irregularities that might accompany them.
This could also be an indicator that the institutions and organizations supporting the effective
functioning of the elections, including international election monitors, were able to reassure
voters of the legitimacy of the election, increasing their levels of confidence in the transparency
of the election.
As with the Benin case study, I am unable to directly link citizens’ increased satisfaction
with democracy and elections in Mali to the presence and involvement of international election
monitors in the presidential elections. Again, however, I am able to claim that the international
election observers and the citizens of Mali arrived at similar conclusions in the evaluation of
presidential elections between 1990 and 2011. Monitors endorsed Mali’s 2002 elections more
strongly than the other elections, and citizens’ indications of preference for democracy, trust in
institutions supporting it, and confidence in elections increased after their own assessments of the
2002 elections. The evidence I found in monitors’ reports and Afrobarometer public opinion
surveys supports my hypothesis that international election monitors’ presence increases Malian
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citizens’ confidence levels in their electoral system. Although international election monitors are
not the sole cause of the increases in Malians’ confidence levels, they do seem to be a
contributing factor. Because democracy was slow in gaining initial support in Mali, it is
important that international election monitors continue their presence during Mali’s presidential
elections to encourage Malians to be even more confident in their trust of democratic processes
and institutions in their country.

The Case of Guinea
Unlike Benin and Mali, which have generally been viewed, until the 2012 coup in Mali,
as two of West Africa’s strongest democracies, Guinea has been less accommodating to
democracy. Military coups and violence have played a much larger role in Guinea’s history and
democratic transition than in the other two cases in this study. Guinea held multiparty
presidential elections in 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2010, and invited international election monitors
to each of them, although monitors’ involvement was very limited in the 1993 and 2003
elections. Lansana Conté won the 1993 election in the first round with 51.7% of the votes cast
(International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1993, 1). The government was not clear in its
communications with election observer missions, and IFES reported that the Guinean
government had a clear lack of concern about international monitoring efforts (International
Foundation for Electoral Systems 1993). International election monitors present declared that
the elections were neither free, nor fair, nor transparent (Jallow 2011). Conté won the presidency
again in 1998 (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie 1998). While there was much
dissent among the Guinean people regarding the election results, the election monitors present
from la Francophonie, NDI, the Organization of African Unity, ECOWAS, and other
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organizations found the elections to be generally free and fair, with some irregularities
(Organisation internationale de la Francophonie 1998; International Foundation for Electoral
Systems 1998). In 2003, Conté won the election for a third time because opposition parties
boycotted the Constitutional amendments he passed that allowed him to stay in power
indefinitely (Jallow 2011). Guinea denied access to domestic election monitors, but allowed
some international monitors to be present in the elections. In September 2009 was the brutal
massacre in Guinea’s capital of Conakry in which governmental forced killed almost 200
citizens who had been rallying for democracy (U.S. Department of State 2012; Jallow 2011;
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012). The elections that occurred in the aftermath of this massacre in
2010 were Guinea’s first free and fair elections that citizens and the international community
recognized as such. Alpha Condé was elected President in December (U.S. Department of State
2012).
The analysis of the case of Guinea is much different than the examinations of Benin and
Mali. This is largely due to the absence of Afrobarometer or other survey data available.
Because no public opinion data is obtainable to the best of my knowledge, I evaluate the
indications of citizens’ views of democracy and election in Guinea by using other secondary
sources. Voter participation levels are historically low in Guinea, because of the prevailing
belief that election outcomes were determined before the elections even took place under Conté’s
presidency. The exception to this low voter turnout was in the 2010 election, when observers
took note of the higher levels of voter turnout (The Carter Center 2010e). In addition, Guineans
seem to be hesitant in their acceptance of democratic values despite their support for the idea of
democracy. Prior to 2010, Guineans had no experience living in a functioning democratic
system. While they expressed their discontent with Conté’s authoritarian-style leadership,
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Guineans also seemed to prefer military rule to a transition of power to a member of Conté’s old
government. Guineans also seem intent on limiting the number of active political parties in order
to minimize violence stemming from too much political competition (Bertelsmann Siftung
2012). However, the support and demand of citizens for free and fair elections is impossible to
ignore. In recent years, Guineans have become more expressive in making their demands for
democratic elections, limits on term length, and a system of checks and balances so the president
does not become the sole source of authority in the government.
Although election monitors were present in all four of Guinea’s presidential elections
since 1990, Conté’s regime undermined the sense of legitimacy election monitors were able to
provide citizens in Benin and Mali, so the same effects did not happen in Guinea. The monitors
were rather generous in declaring that the 1998 and 2003 elections were free and fair, since
unlike in Benin and Mali, these monitors’ reports did not match the public’s sentiments. Citizens
have just begun to become more optimistic about Guinea’s democratic prospects since the 2010
elections. As international election monitors become more familiar with the functioning of
democracy and Guinea, and citizens become more aware of monitors’ presence and mission,
monitors should become more in tune with citizens’ perspectives and views, and citizens should
trust the monitors’ ability to report honestly on the conduct of the elections and therefore have
greater levels of confidence in the electoral process. Although the support for my hypothesis in
the case of Guinea is not as strong as it is in the cases of Benin and Mali, there is still evidence
that suggests that international election monitors are one of the many factors contributing to
Guineans’ increasing confidence in the transparency of their elections and the functioning of
democracy in their country. There is no way of knowing how low Guineans’ confidence in their
system could have been if international monitors were not present at any of the elections. The
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continued support of international election monitors during Guinea’s presidential elections in the
future will encourage citizens to continue to build their trust in the electoral system and the
institutions that sustain it.

Conclusions
Implications
This study has found evidence to support the hypothesis that formal government
adherence to the norm of international election monitoring bolsters citizens’ confidence levels in
their domestic electoral process. This implies that international election monitoring is a “key
mechanism for diffusing pro-democracy norms” (van Sickle and Sandholtz 2009, 297). There is
currently no way to measure the effects of international election monitors. Because no method
for this measurement exists—such as surveys asking citizens to evaluate the international
election monitors—I turned to specific data about elections between 1990 and 2011 to evaluate
monitors’ effects on citizens’ confidence levels.
Bratton (2007) uses a correlation test to find that citizens’ perceptions of the last election
affect the strength of their support for the next elections. This relationship, while statistically
significant, is not very strong because elections with irregularities do not detract from citizens’
confidence levels at the same rate as well-run elections increase their confidence levels (Bratton
2007, 68). This is supported by the sentiment that “the publics of many African countries
continue to support elections even when they are disappointed with the systems that have
evolved” (Herbst 2011, 395). While this notion holds positive implications for the furthering of
democratic processes and institutions in the developing world, it means that the impact of actors
such as international and domestic election monitors is harder to observe.

117
Bratton (2007) and Herbst’s (2011) findings reflect my own research based on
Afrobarometer survey results and data about voter turnout levels in the elections in Benin, Mali
and Guinea. After particularly successful and well-run elections that international election
monitors deemed free and fair, citizens were more likely to reflect increased levels of confidence
in political institutions, support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, and perceptions of
the freeness and fairness of the elections. The contribution of international election monitors to
this increased confidence is impossible to distinguish with the present data available, but there is
evidence of a connection between the two variables. This connection is reinforced by the fact
that “international observers and ordinary voters arrive at similar judgments about which
countries have free and fair elections, and which do not” (Bratton 2007, 78). Since international
election monitors and voters tend to share a similar outlook on elections, it seems as if citizens
are likely to evaluate elections as free and fair when monitors are present and evaluate the
elections in the same manner.
Looking to the future, it is important to recognize that international election monitors
cannot and should not be the permanent mechanism for building and maintaining citizen
confidence levels in the electoral process.
Although observers from overseas may be more familiar with the intricacies of
democratic electoral practice, and while some may be very effective as trainers of
local people who have not previously observed elections, it must be remembered
that international observers are short-term visitors to the countries holding
elections and are frequently unfamiliar with the local society, its politics, the areas
to which they are posted, and especially the local language. As such, their main
purpose is to transmit what they observe to the outside world, and especially to
the members of the international donor community which increasingly conditions
aid programmes on whether democratic transitions are on track. (United Nations
Department for Development Support and Management Services 1997, 20)
After international observer missions complete their tasks in a country, they leave until the next
election. Therefore, the governments in emerging democracies must recognize the importance of
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strengthening their own electoral commissions and allow domestic monitors to play a role in the
electoral process. Domestic monitors may be a longer-term safeguard against election fraud and
manipulation, as “worldwide evidence shows that domestic observation constitutes a booming
activity in the democracy domain, and it has no doubt contributed significantly to democratic
development by improving the electoral conditions of a given country” (López-Pintor 2007, 2627).

Limitations of the Study
As with any study, there were certain constraints that limited my ability to reach definite
conclusions in support of my hypothesis. Time was a significant constraint in this study. With
more time available, I could explore more cases to strengthen my findings about the relationship
between the variables in my model. Another limitation of this study is the lack of survey data
available for Guinea, and limited data available for all of the elections between 1990 and 2011.
Since I did not select my cases based on the availability of survey data, I had to attempt to draw
conclusions about Guineans’ confidence levels based on indicators in other sources, but not
directly from public opinion data, as I was able to use in the cases of Benin and Mali. Although
there was evidence to support my hypothesis in all three cases, the results I found are not
conclusive since there is currently no way to establish a definite connection between
international election monitors and increased levels of citizens’ confidence in elections. In fact,
as of now there is no effective way to measure the impacts of international election monitors at
all. If Afrobarometer included a question asking citizens to rate their perceptions of trust in
international election monitoring organizations, or whether they felt that elections were freer and
fairer when election monitors were present, I would be able to more confidently conclude
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whether a positive relationship between the presence of international election monitors and
citizen confidence levels exists.
I intentionally limited my study to the region francophone West Africa. This allowed me
to hold constant the variable of colonial history, which affects the past governance of the cases,
but also plays a strong role in structuring the government and institutions still in place in the
countries today. West Africa is an area full of emerging democracies, and a region that many
scholars focus on in their studies of democratization. However, there is limited scholarship
available on the role of international election monitors in these areas. Therefore, this study fills a
gap in the existing literature.

Suggestions for Further Research
This study has suggested a positive relationship exists between government adherence to
the norm of international election monitoring, as represented by the presence of international
monitors during presidential elections, and citizens’ confidence levels in their domestic electoral
processes. There are a few directions that would be beneficial to take further research. One
approach is to expand the study to study the effects of domestic election management bodies
(EMBs), such as CENA and CENI, as well as domestic election monitoring groups on citizen
confidence. As I conducted research, I realized how crucial EMBs and domestic election
monitors are to the effective management and regulation of elections. Another approach would
be to broaden the study to include cases in other regions of the world, using public opinion data
when available to evaluate citizens’ confidence levels. As more research and reports become
available about election monitors’ presence in presidential elections and citizens’ evaluations of
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democracy in their countries, this study will be able to expand drastically and come to more
definitive conclusions about the relationship between the two variables.
The last suggestion is to expand the years included in the evaluation of international
election monitors’ effects on citizens’ confidence levels in the electoral process in their country.
This study does not include elections that occurred after 2011. Since that date, Mali has
experienced large levels of violence due to ethnic tensions that escalated into a rebellion that
overthrew Touré on March 22, 2012. Amadou Haya Sanogo was the leader of the coup, but he
handed power back over to a civilian government in April, under the interim presidency of
Dioncounda Traore. In May 2012, Traore was attacked and had to leave the country for several
months to recover. While ECOWAS is working with the interim government, there is still much
turmoil in the country (Central Intelligence Agency 2013b). The next presidential elections are
sure to be replete with controversy, so the role of international election monitors in these future
elections will be interesting to observe in the case of Mali, as well as in Benin and Guinea, to see
if the relationship between international monitors and citizens’ confidence levels continues to
hold a positive correlation.
Overall, this study has made important steps in advancing the study of the effects of the
norm of international election monitoring on voters’ confidence levels. My research suggests
that international observers’ presence during elections may in fact bolster citizens’ confidence
levels in the efficacy and transparency of the electoral process in their country. However, the
inability to measure the effects of international election monitors on citizens’ confidence levels
means that it is currently impossible to find strong evidence in support of or opposition to my
hypothesis. Future research on this topic will be crucial to promoting the strengthening of
democracy in countries in francophone West Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.
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